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I. INTRODUCTION 
There was no evident reason why the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers. 1 It can be conceded that 
the issue was important: in the midst of an agricultural depression, a 
farmer was trying to hang onto his farm without paying the full 
amount of his bank debt. The farmer argued that he ought to be able 
to do so because he was offering to contribute "new value"2 beyond 
what he was obliged to contribute - specifically, his efforts as a 
farmer. 
The Eighth Circuit held, in effect, that he could do so and the 
Supreme Court (as became apparent) thought the Eighth Circuit was 
wrong. 3 But these facts alone hardly justify Supreme Court interven-
tion. By common understanding, the Eighth Circuit decision was a 
maverick.4 The issue was, on its face, statutory only. if the Supreme 
Court had any role, the obvious choice was simply to order summary 
reversal. The Court chose instead to address the issue head-on. 
Now, the decision having been _rendered, it is still not obvious just 
what the Court had in mind. The Court did reverse the Eighth Cir-
cuit - just as it might have in summary reversal. It held that the 
bank had a right to be paid in full before the farmer got anything -
the so-called rule of "absolute priority." On the question of new 
value, the Court refused to hold that new value would never suffice to 
get around the rule. But it held that the contribution of labor, which 
the farmer offered in this case, would not be sufficient to take him out 
of the rule. Thus, by all appearances, the Court rendered judgment 
with an opinion which purports to add nothing to the law as it has 
been understood for fifty years. One is necessarily led to speculate as 
to just what the fuss was all about. It could be that the justices made a 
mistake: that they thought they saw an issue where in fact there 
1. 108 s. Ct. 963 (1988). 
2. The use of the phrase "new value" is not standard, but it seems convenient for present 
purposes, and I will adopt it as a shorthand for the problem discussed here. On the related "no 
value" theory, see infra text accompanying notes 256-61. 
3. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 402 (8th Cir. 1986), revd. sub nom. Norwest Bank Worthing-
ton v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 {1988). The district court held that the plan was not confirmable 
under the ~ircumstances. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393. Reversing and remanding, the Eighth 
Circuit had outlined what it conceived of as a confirmable plan. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399. 
4. One bankrUptcy court had taken a position apparently consistent with the Eighth Circuit. 
See In re Star City Rebuilders, Inc., 62 Bankr. 983, 988 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986). Within months 
after the Eighth Circuit decision, a lower court, in the same circuit found it possible to distinguish 
Ahlers. See In re Baugh, 73 Bankr. 414, 418-20 (Banki. E.D. Ark. 1987). The eccentricity of the 
Eighth Circuit in Ahlers marks a contrast between this issue and the issue of "opportunity cost" 
in United Sav. Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988), where the 
Supr.,me Court, just a few weeks earlier, resolved a genuine, active, current conflict among 
circuits. 
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turned out to be none. 5 It could be that they wanted to head off a 
spasm of judicial sympathy for debtors in the farm belt. 
Or it could be anything. Speculation of this sort, in the absence of 
hard evidence, is necessarily futile. What is not futile, however, is an 
effort to understand the Ahlers opinion itself, which remains a force to 
contend with in Supreme Court bankruptcy jurisprudence. And the 
opinion is important in at least two ways. First, the opinion offers a 
striking insight into the way the Court approaches bankruptcy law -
which conceptual tools it chooses to use, and which it chooses to ig-
nore. Specifically, it is remarkable just how narrowly the justices de-
fined the issue before them - how completely they chose to make it 
an issue of statutory construction only, resisting or ignoring any possi-
ble constitutional tincture. 
Of greater practical interest is the Court's handling of the problem 
of new value. The Solicitor General asked the Court to hold that there 
is no new value rule under the new Bankruptcy Code. The Court re-
fused to go that far, saying that it was taking no position on whether 
there is such a rule. But on closer scrutiny, it appears that the Court, 
advertently or otherwise, at least sharply restricted the use of the new 
value rule in future cases. Even more intriguing, a review of Ahlers in 
context raises a question as to whether there ever was a conceptual 
basis for the new value rule, at least as conventionally understood. 
Both of these points require a fairly extensive sojourn into history. 
For Ahlers is a case with a past, as well as a future. Thus, in Part II, I 
sketch the history of the absolute priority doctrine. I undertake to 
show also how the Supreme Court had available two very different 
paths to its result - one constitutional, one statutory. And I offer a 
few thoughts on the relationship between the two. In Part III, I ad-
dress myself directly to the new value rule. I try to show that it is a 
rule whose parentage is at best questionable. I also try to give an ac-
count of what a new value rule might look like. In that context, I 
suggest that Justice White may have invalidated any new value rule 
that did exist, and indeed, that there may never have been any ade-
quate basis for such a principle. 6 
II. ABSOLUTE PRIORITY 
A. Ahlers on Absolute Priority 
On its face, Ahlers is simply a case of a farmer struggling to keep 
5. For an unsupported hypothesis, see the discussion infra at Part III.A. 
6. The court granted partial certiorari in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 107 S. Ct. 
3227 (1987). 
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his farm.7 James and Mary Ahlers farmed 840 acres in southwestern 
Minnesota, on the edge of the grain belt of the Great Plains. They 
owed $525,854 to the Federal Land Bank (FLB), on four separate 
loans secured by four separate parcels of farmland, and owed $450,468 
to Norwest. Norwest held a junior security interest (behind the FLB) 
on the land, and a senior security interest on some machinery and 
equipment. The Ahlerses also owed smaller sums on purchase-money 
security interests to equipment suppliers and (apparently) a small 
amount of unsecured trade debt. 
When Ahlers fell behind in his payments on these debts, Norwest 
attempted to replevy the equipment, prompting Ahlers to file for pro-
tection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which would have 
automatically stayed the collection actions. FLB and Norwest both 
asked the court for relief from the automatic stay and for adequate 
protection of their security interests. Norwest also continued its pre-
bankruptcy replevin action in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy 
court, finding that the Ahlerses could not give adequate protection, 
granted relief from the stay, and also granted Norwest the right to 
replevin. The district court affirmed, and also reviewed a plan of reor-
ganization proposed by the Ahlerses. The district court found that the 
plan had no reasonable prospect of success. 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred 
both in_ defining adequate protection, and in holding the reorganiza-
tion unfeasible. The court also took the extraordinary step, on its own 
initiative, of outlining a possible plan of reorganization that it felt 
might win confirmation by creditors.8 Under the court plan, secured 
claims would have been fully paid with interest over a thirty-year pe-
riod. Unsecured claims would have been fully paid without interest. 
FLB and Norwest objected to confirmation, relying on the so-
called absolute priority rule. This rule provides, as stated by the court, 
"that a dissenting class of unsecured creditors must be provided for in 
full before any j'1~nior class can receive or retain any property under 
the plan."9 The Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") codifies this rule, 10 
and all parties agreed that the Code partially codifies Supreme Court 
case law dating back over seventy-five years as well. 11 
7. This statement of facts derives primarily from the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In re 
Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 392-93 (8th Cir. 1986), rehg. denied, 794 F.2d 414 (1986), revd. sub nom. 
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988). 
8. This "suggested" plan is presented as an appendix to the circuit court opinion. Ahlers, 794 
F.2d at 408-14. 
9. 794 F.2d at 401. 
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1986). 
11. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-05 (1913); Case v. Los Angeles Lum-
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The creditors argued, and the court agreed, that the creditors' un-
secured deficiency claim would not be paid in full. 12 Hence, the credi-
tors argued that it was unlawful for the Ahlerses to keep anything 
under the plan. The Eighth Circuit accepted the analysis but rejected 
the conclusion. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, it reasoned that 
there is a "modification"13 to the absolute priority rule that would al-
low the Ahlerses to participate in the plan. Specifically, the Ahlerses 
might participate if they contributed something to the reorganized en-
terprise "that is reasonably compensatory and is measurable"14 - the 
so-called new value principle.15 In a 2-1 decision, the court held that 
the Ahlerses' "farm operation and management skills" constituted 
new value. A sharply divided court denied rehearing en bane. 16 
The Supreme Court granted certiorarl on the absolute priority 
question only.17 A unanimous Supreme Court, Justice White writing, 
reversed. Justice White's opinion can be tightly summarized. He held 
that the Ahlerses' promise of future labor did not justify an exception 
to the absolute priority rule. But for a fuller appreciation of his ration-
ale, it is useful to identify four separate points in the opinion, as 
follows: 
First: Justice White accepted as binding the principle of absolute 
priority as codified in the Bankruptcy Code. 18 This is hardly surpris-
her Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 119-22 (1939). A good case can be made for the proposition that 
the rule goes back much further. See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany and 
Chicago Ry., 174 U.S. 674-84 (1899); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. RR. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 392, 411 (1868). See also infra text accompanying notes 26-66. 
12. The opinion doesn't spell out the point, but the crux is that the court plan provided for 
payment of the nominal amount of the unsecured claims, but in installments over 10.5 years 
without interest. 794 F.2d at 413. If the "effective" rate is anything above zero, then the credi-
tors are not being paid in full. 
13. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401 ("[T]he Supreme Court specifically recognized that there may 
be circumstances in which the absolute priority rule could be modified .... "). Justice White 
refers to "an 'exception' or 'modification' to the absolute priority rule .... " Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 
966. To what extent this new value principle is a "modification," an "exception," or simply 
implicit in the rule is an issue discussed infra at Part 111.B. 
14. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402. 
15. The court relied, inter alia, on Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 
(1939); Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926); and also on 
In re U.S. Truck Co., 47 Bankr. 932 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Marston Enters., 13 Bankr. 
514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); and In re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1981). Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401-03. · 
16. 794 F.2d 414 (1986). There were two dissenting opinions in the 5-4 vote. 794 F.2d at 
415. 
17. Ahlers, 101 S. Ct. 3227 (1987). 
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The debtors had advanced various argu-
ments to the effect that the absolute priority rule should not apply in a case like this, but Justice 
White gave them short shrift. Of particular interest is Justice White's summary dismissal of the 
argument that there is some sort of "roving commission" to do equity in bankruptcy cases: 
"[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised 
within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." See Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 968-69. 
968 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:963 
ing: indeed, no one really challenged it. But it is nonetheless an essen-
tial building block for understanding his analysis. 
Second: Justice White accepted, for purposes of analysis, that 
there is a new value exception to the absolute priority rule. Some of 
the briefs, particularly that of the Solicitor General, had urged him to 
hold that there was no such exception under the Bankruptcy Code,19 
but Justice White refused to go so far. 
Third: Justice White found that the Ahlerses' " 'labor, experience 
and expertise' "20 were not a sufficient contribution to permit them to 
keep their farm, in a case where they were paying the bank less than 
the full amount owed. Justice White thus treated the case as "analo-
gous" to Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 21 which everyone 
conceded is the leading case in the field. 
Finally, Justice White rejected one more of the Ahlerses' argu-
ments, which is related to, but separate from, the arguments discussed 
so far. Specifically, the Ahlerses argued that the Bank wasn't being 
deprived of anything because the Bank was getting all it could have 
gotten for the farm in liquidation. Thus, the interest they wished to 
retain had no value to the Bank. Justice White identified and rejected 
this "no value" theory, as he called it.22 Even so, the implications of 
that rejection are probably far more important than the opinion sug-
gests - perhaps more than even he understood, as will be discussed 
below in Part III. 
B. Our Two Laws of Absolute Priority 
The first remarkable fact about Ahlers is its doctrinal posture. The 
court - and indeed, all of the parties and amici - treated it as a 
problem under the absolute priority rule, developed in a well-known 
series of cases and crystallized in Bankruptcy Code section 
1129(b )(2)(B). I shall label this the "statutory" line of cases. While 
this is a perfectly legitimate way to approach the issue, there is a 
wholly separate body of doctrine more closely suited to the facts of 
Ahlers, which arose to deal with the regulation of farm foreclosures in 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. This separate body of doctrine 
treats the problem as involving the taking of property, governed by the 
19. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17-20, Norwest 
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (No. 86-958). 
20. 108 S. Ct. at 966 (quoting In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 403). 
21. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). See Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 967 ("Los Angeles Lumber itself rejected 
an analogous proposition .••. "). 
22. 108 S. Ct. at 969. 
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due process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution;23 I shall 
label this the "constitutional" line of cases. 
The Court in Ahlers never even considered this constitutional line, 
although there may be good reasons for its adherence to the statutory, 
line. It is an accepted tradition that the courts "do not review issues, 
especially constitutional issues, until they have to."24 In Ahlers, the 
Court had available a statutory formula which could be made to fit the 
facts. By holding only that labor does not constitute new value, the 
Court avoided any decision concerning whether absolute priority was 
constitutionally mandated. In so doing, it avoided a constitutional de-
termination concerning the new value rule. Additionally, the courts 
(and the commentators with them) have always kept these two lines of 
authority in separate, water-tight compartments with only trifling 
seepage between the two. Trifling as it is, this seepage links these di-
vergent principles. 
1. The Statutory Line 
The first point to be understood about the "statutory line" is that it 
is not "statutory" - or at best, is statutory only incidentally and be-
latedly. To Justice White, the issue in Ahlers turned on the language 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 25 But the Code's language must be read 
under layers of case law that run back more than 100 years.26 
The early history of the absolute priority rule has been told before 
and can be quickly recapitulated here. The rule arose in the context of 
the equity receivership.27 The equity receivership, in turn, is bound up 
23. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
24. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Co=. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). 
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1987). 
26. Justice White stated that the absolute priority rule "had its genesis in judicial construc-
tion of the undefined requirement of the early bankruptcy statute that reorganization plans be 
'fair and equitable.' " 108 S. Ct. at 966. For this proposition, he cited N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 
228 U.S. 482, 498 (1913), and Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 
674, 677 (1899). He was on the right track, but he didn't get it quite right. In fact, both Boyd 
and Louisville Trust are equity receivership cases, where the court exercised its pre-Erie power to 
fashion commercial law. Statutory interpretation comes in with Case v. Los Angeles Lumber 
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114 (1939). 
27. The literature on equity receiverships is vast, although it is hard to find a tight summary 
in any single source. The "official" version, though not readily accessible, is in SEcuRmES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIV-
mES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 
(1937-1939) [hereinafter PROTECTIVE CoMMITTEE STUDY]. See also Sabel, Equity Jurisdiction 
in the United States Courts with Reference to Consent Receiverships (pts. 1 & 2), 19 IOWA L. REv. 
406, 540 (1934); Note, The Propriety of Friendly Receiverships in the Federal Courts, 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 1298 (1930); Note, Consent Receiverships, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 979 (1933); Comment, Equity 
Receiverships in Federal Courts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 542 (1933). For "textbook" accounts, see 1 R. 
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with the building of the railroads. From the Civil War until World 
War II, investors repeatedly built railroads that could not generate 
operating revenues sufficient to service their debt.28 Picture a railroad 
that borrows $100 to lay down rail lines and build stations, selling 
$100 worth of bonds and giving the creditor-bondholder a senior 
mortgage on all the plant and equipment. Suppose the interest rate is 
5%: Thus, the road needs $5 of revenue per year just for debt service. 
Suppose the railroad also owes an additional $20 to junior, unsecured 
trade creditors. Suppose the railroad generates only $4 a year of in-
come above operating costs. One way of interpreting these numbers is 
to say that the plant and equipment are "worth" no more than $80 -
$4 per year capitalized at 5%. One solution to the problem would be 
simply to "give" the railroad to the bondholders. They lose $20 on 
their $100 investment, but they capture the whole value of the enter-
prise, and junior interests, including trade creditors and stockholders, 
are extinguished. 
But the equity receivership didn't work that way. Instead, a "cred-
itor," often in collusion with management, would file a proceeding in 
federal court, alleging that the debtor was unable to pay its debts as 
they matured. He would ask the court to use its equity power to ad-
minister the property for the satisfaction of claims, and to appoint a 
receiver to keep the business going in the meantime: hence, "equity 
receivership. "29 The debtor would consent. Eventually, the receiver 
would "sell" the assets to a "new" entity - typically a reshuffling of 
the old investors. The price would be lower than the amount of the 
senior debt - in the current example, the buyers might agree to pay 
$30 for a railroad "worth" $80. The money would go to senior bond-
holders, but they would receive less than the total of their claim ($100) 
and less even than the nominal worth of the road ($80). Unsecured 
creditors would be eliminated, but the "new" entity, controlled by 
stockholders of the "old," would emerge with a company worth $80, 
for which they had paid only $30. · 
One may well ask why creditors would ever assent to such a deal, 
CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACI'ICE OF RECEIVERS§ 188 (2d ed. 1929); 1 J, 
GERDES, CoRPORATE REORGANIZATIONS§§ 11-12 (1936); G. GLENN, THE LAW GOVERNING 
LIQUIDATION§ 172 (1935). Racier, nontechnical accounts may be found in E. HOWARD, WALL 
STREET FIFIY YEARS AFTER ERIE (1923); M. LoWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933). 
28. A leading reorganization lawyer noted in 1927 that as of March, 1916, 16% of the na-
tion's total rail mileage (80 railroads, 42,000 miles) was in receivership; at the end of 1925 these 
figures were 48 railroads with 18,000 miles of track. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: 
Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 21 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 901 (1927). 
29. The validity of the practice seems to have been established by In re Metropolitan Ry. 
Receivership, 208 U.S. 90 (1908). See also the comments of Judge Learned Hand in Luhrig 
Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 281 F. 265, 268-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). 
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let alone collude in it. There are two reasons. One is the price of 
justice: old shareholders found out that they could always raise objec-
tions which, however invalid, might cost time and money to litigate. 
So seniors often found it cheaper to buy them off than to insist on their 
rights.30 A far more important reason is that the typical reorganiza-
tion was controlled by "managers" - insiders who had an interest 
both in bonds and in stock. For the insider-managers, it didn't matter 
if they lost on bonds if they gained on stock. This approach is inno-
cent enough for those who hold both bonds and stock, but it is devas-
tating to those who do not. In particular, this approach damages two 
groups. One is the unsecured trade creditors. The other group is the 
noninsider bondholders, not part of the management ring, who don't 
hold stock and who don't have the inducement of the managers to 
trade away their bond interest.31 
This modus vivendi collapsed during the Great Depression under 
the weight of the investor protective legislation implemented by the 
New Deal.32 Those regulatory changes have become so pervasive that 
they are almost part of the air we breathe. To understand the absolute 
priority rule, it is necessary to recognize that it emerged first as a prim-
itive pre-statutory effort to regulate receiverships in the judicial 
process. 
In the chronicle of case law, the critical juncture is Northern Pa-
cific Railway Co. v. Boyd, decided 5-4 by the Supreme Court in 1913.33 
30. The classic case seeking to restrict the debtor's power to litigate creditors into submission 
is Fleischmann & Devine, Inc. v. Saul Wolfson Dry Goods Co., 299 F. 15 (5th Cir. 1924). 
Fleischmann is not an equity receivership case; it can be thought of as a precursor of the "best 
interests" liquidation test of Bankruptcy Code§ 1129(a)(7). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1982). See 
also SEC v. Canandaigua Enters. Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964); PROTECTIVE CoMMITfEE 
STUDY, supra note 27, at pt. 8, § 72. 
31. For a dramatic instance of court-sanctioned minority victimization, see Aladdin Hotel 
Co. v. Bloom, 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953). 
32. See, e.g., Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982)); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, 49 Stat. 803 
(1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); Investment Company 
Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § SOa-1 to -64 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); Chapter X of the old Bankruptcy Act, codified in former 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 501-676 (repealed 1978); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (codified 
as amended at 15 u.s.c. § 77aaa-yyy (1982)). See MEMORANDUM OF HOMER KRIPKE, REPORT 
OF THE CoMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 359-61 (1973). On the courts' declining enthusiasm for equity receiver-
ships, see First Natl. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504 (1934); New England Coal & 
Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R. Co., 143 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1944). 
33. 228 U.S. 482 (1913). The Northern Pacific is intimately involved in the history of rail-
road and corporate finance. Chartered in 1884, the railroad went through receivership twice, 
first in 1873 and then again (the case cited here) in 1893. For a detailed summary of the Road's 
finances in the second receivership, see Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 177 F. 804, 817 (9th Cir. 
1910). The 1893 reorganization took place under the aegis of J.P. Morgan, the banker, and J.J. 
Hill, of the competing Great Northern Railway Company. In 1901, the Northern Pacific, the 
Great Northern Railway, and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy were brought together in the 
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Boyd was a general creditor of the Northern Pacific Railroad. The 
"Road" asserted that it was not liable, in that all of its property had 
been transferred (via receivership) to the Northern Pacific Railway. 34 
Boyd then sued the Railway, which, of course, claimed that it was 
insulated in that it had purchased the assets via a bona fide receiver-
ship. But by the Court's account, the receivership sale was in fact a 
transfer engineered by the old bondholders and stockholders from 
themselves and to themselves, "squeezing out" the intermediate un-
secured debt. The Court held that such a sale cannot defeat the claim 
of a nonassenting creditor. As against him the sale is void in equity, 
regardless of the motive with which it is made. 35 As the Court put it: 
"[l]f purposely or unintentionally a single creditor was not paid, or 
provided for in the reorganization, he could assert his superior rights 
against the subordinate interests of the old stockholders in the prop-
erty transferred to the new company."36 
The decision sent chills of terror down the spines of the corporate 
reorganization bar.37 It may be hard to see why. The Supreme Court 
prefigured the Boyd decision in the so-called ''Monon" case just four-
teen years before. 38 And the Boyd Court found the same principle in 
another case a half century earlier. 39 Moreover, Boyd's claim seemed 
peculiarly appealing because it dated back twenty-seven years; he and 
his predecessor had been pursuing it like the fat man pursuing the 
Maltese falcon. And while the Supreme Court expressly refused to 
find any "fraud" in the proceeding,40 the Court's own summary sug-
Northern Securities Company, also controlled by Morgan and Hill with others. In the Northern 
Securities Case, the United States Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the company. The 
Northern Pacific thereupon reverted to its former status, in which form it remained until it 
became part of Burlington Northern, Inc., in 1970. See generally User's Guide to the Northern 
Pacific Papers in the holdings of the Minnesota Historical Society, Northern Pacific Railway 
Company Papers, Part I, 1864-1922 (W. White ed. 1985). 
34. The flummery over name changes in equity receiverships may account for one of the 
more cherished arcana in the Bluebook - the distinction between the abbreviation used in citing 
the name of a Railroad (R.R.) and that used in citing the name of a Railway (Ry.). A UNIFORM 
SYSTEM OF CITATION R.10.2.2(a) (14th ed. 1986). 
35. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 502. 
36. 228 U.S. at 504. 
37. "The Boyd case was received by the reorganization bar and bankers with something akin 
to horror. It has been a nightmare to the lawyer who presents a decree for the sale of property to 
a reorganization committee." Rosenberg, Reorganization - The Next Step, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 
14 (1922). See generally Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations: Bondholders' and Stock-
holders' Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees, and the Voluntary Recapitalization of 
Corporations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND 
REGULATION 191-98 (The Association of the Bar of the City of New York ed. 1917). 
38. Louisville Trot Co. v. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674 
(1899). 
39. 228 U.S. at 505 (citing Railroad Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392 (1868)). 
40. 228 U.S. at 503-04. 
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gests that Boyd had bought himself, at the very least, a persistent, de-
termined, and resilient foe. 
On the other hand, Boyd itself was a bare five-four majority: four 
judges, while not rejecting the principle, indicated that they felt the 
fairness of the plan had been well ventilated by other creditors in the 
original proceeding.41 They treated Boyd as something of a spoilsport, 
like the guest who arrives late at the wedding and tells stories about 
the .bride just as the festivities are about to begin. Under the circum-
stances, lawyers may have been justified in seeing the Supreme Court 
as more insistent on the principle than it had been before. · 
In any event, absolute priority thereafter passed into the language 
and lore of the corporate lawyer.42 But ingrained practice seems to 
have proved stronger than writ, as reorganization lawyers developed 
elaborate schemes to circumvent or emasculate the rule. Thus, coun-
sel developed the practice of getting the reorganization court to bless 
the deal, with the intent of barring later objections.43 Some courts 
seem to have assumed (in the teeth of Boyd) that acceptance by a sub-
stantial majority of senior creditors gave evidence of the fairness of the 
plan.44 And reorganization managers learned how to engineer the 
process so as to discourage dissent. 45 Fifteen years after Boyd, two 
scholars were able to argue that corporate practice recognized two pri-
ority rules - a rule of absolute priority, a la Boyd, and a rule of "rela-
tive" priority, functioning in practice much like the informal "share" 
scheme that obtained before Boyd. 46 And then there was the wild-
card uncertainty of new value, discussed in Part III below. Moreover, 
Congress complicated matters during the Great Depression by adopt-
ing legislation to supplant the equity receivership, without really clari-
fying how it wanted to deal with the new value problem.47 
41. 228 U.S. at 511-15 (Lurton, J., dissenting). 
42. The first important use of the term seems to have occurred in Bonbright & Bergerman, 
Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 
COLUM. L. REV. 127, 130 (1928). 
43. See Swaine, supra note 28, at 907-11. 
44. Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co., 20 F.2d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 1927); Samuels v. Northeast-
ern Pub. Serv. Co., 20 Del. Ch. 204, 211, 174 A. 127, 130 (Del. Ch. 1934). 
45. Weiner, The Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization, 27 
CoLUM. L. REv. 132 (1927), outlines the process by which the upset price, designed as a method 
for protecting debtors, evolved into a device for scotching dissent. 
46. Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 42. Bonbright, who first embraced the relative-pri-
ority alternative, later repented and called for "the strictest feasible enforcement of the absolute-
priority idea." 2 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 868 n.64 (1937). 
47. Particularly, Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204 § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (repealed 1978); Act 
of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed 1938) (corporate reorganizations). 
Downtown Inv. Co. v. Boston Metro. Bldgs., Inc., 81 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1936), held that the 
absolute priority rule did not apply under § 77B. See Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's Reform Program/qr Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 223, 236 (1938). 
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That was the situation as it stood when the Supreme Court decided 
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. in 1939.48 The facts of Case 
are simple: the debtor holding company had liabilities of $3.8 million 
and held a subsidiary that owned the Los Angeles Shipyard and Dry-
dock - an asset valued at $830,000. The plan was to cancel old 
securities and issue new ones in their place. Some twenty-three per-
cent of the new securities would go to the former stockholders. 49 Both 
lower courts confirmed the plan, but a unanimous Supreme Court50 
reversed. 
The case is both historically and doctrinally important. In terms 
of political history, the case marks a milestone in the career of Justice 
William 0. Douglas, who wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. 
Douglas had served on the Court less than a year at the time of the 
decision, having come from the chairmanship of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.51 At the SEC, he was one of the principal archi-
tects of the New Deal corporate law reforms, and one of the authors of 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. 52 His opinion adopts much of the 
substance of an amicus brief filed by the SEC. s3 
As an instance of decisionmaking strategy, the case is noteworthy 
because it is the first major absolute priority case in which the Court 
interprets a statute. And indeed, Justice Douglas' interpretation has 
become so rooted in the culture of the law that it is a surprise to note 
just how attenuated it is. For the statute - Bankruptcy Act, section 
77B, the precursor of Chapter X - nowhere states that claims must 
be paid by a principle of absolute priority.54 Instead, Justice Douglas 
48. 308 U.S. 106, rehg. denied, 308 U.S. 637 (1939). 
49. 308 U.S. at 112. The 23% figure seems imprecise, but it is close enough for present 
purposes. 
50. Justice Butler did not participate. 
51. Indeed, Justice Douglas' participation in Case carries just a hint of that kind of partisan· 
ship which, in a later generation, might have given rise to an imputation of impropriety. Justice 
Douglas was sworn in on April 17, 1939, succeeding Justice Brandeis, who resigned on February 
13, 1939. See J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY 192, 199 (1980). The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Case on May 22, 1939. Billyou points out that the SEC was on record supporting 
absolute priority as early as January, 1939. Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bank· 
ruptcy Reorganization: New Directions, 61 HARV. L. REv. 553, 563 n.31 (1954). 
52. See generally Hopkirk, William 0. Douglas - His Work in Policing Bankruptcy Proceed· 
ings, 18 VAND. L. REV. 663 (1965); Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate 
and Securities Regulation, 13 YALE L.J. 920, 934-951 (1964). Justice Douglas, in his autobiogra-
phy, says that he wrote Chapter X along with Abe Fortas and U.S. Rep. Walter Chandler. See 
W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 260 (1974). His biographer recounts that Douglas' 
mother, as an impoverished widow, had lost money that she entrusted to a lawyer for investment. 
See J. SIMON, supra note 51, at 27. 
53. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods., 
308 U.S. 106 (1939) (Nos. 23 & 24). 
54. Pub. L. No. 73-296, 48 Stat. 912 (1933) (repealed 1978). 
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deploys a provision in subsection (f), which provides that a plan must 
be "fair and equitable." These words, Justice Douglas writes, "are 
words of art which prior to the advent of Section 77B had acquired a 
fixed meaning through judicial interpretations in the field of equity 
receivership reorganizations."55 Strictly speaking, this is poppycock, 
and Justice Douglas knew it. None of the Supreme Court's absolute 
priority cases used that particular phrase in that particular way. In-
deed, Justice Douglas himself cites only one prior use of the term in 
case law, and that is in an appellate opinion which the Supreme Court 
later overturned. 56 On the other hand, the question was at least open, 
and it was reasonable to infer that the drafters intended to import at 
least some kind of absolute priority rule into Section 77B. 57 
But what kind of rule? Substantively, the remarkable fact about 
Case is that over ninety percent of all bondholders had accepted the 
plan.58 Justice Douglas held that this fact was "immaterial on the ba-
sic issue of its fairness."59 The only possible inferen~e was that this 
time, the Supreme Court meant business. 
Case interpreted old Section 77B, already superseded before the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion. 60 But the Court soon made clear 
that the "fair and equitable" language also applied under the supersed-
ing Chapter X. 61 The Court also articulated one further principle nee-· 
essary to make the absolute priority rule work in practice. Thus, in 
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 62 the Court held that in 
order to apply the absolute priority rule, a finding as to the value of 
the reorganized enterprise must be made. 63 On reflection, this seems 
SS. 308 U.S. at 11S. 
S6. Flershem v. National Radiator Corp., 64 F.2d 847, 8S2 (3d Cir. 1933), modified sub nom. 
First Natl. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U.S. S04 (1934) (cited in 308 U.S. at 118 n.9). 
Justice Douglas also cited a number of variants of the phrase. See 308 U.S. at 118. 
S7. Also, it must be conceded that the analysis did not originate with Justice Douglas. Much 
of Justice Douglas' rhetoric on "fair and equitable" is drawn from the government's brief, which 
in tum relies on Spaeth & Winks, The Boyd Case and Section 77. 32 ILL. L. R.Ev. 769, 778-88. 
(1938). See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24-29, 2S n.27, Case v. Los Angeles 
Lumber Prods., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (Nos. 23 and 24). The government also conceded that the 
rule had not been consistently applied. See id. at 18. Not all scholarly authority supported 
Justice Douglas at the time. See Dodd, supra note 47, at 23S-S6. 
S8. By the Court's account, holders of 92.81 % of the bonds, 99.7S% of the Class A stock, 
and 90% of the Class B stock accepted the plan. 308 U.S. at I IS. Case himself had bonds in the 
face amount of $18,SOO. The plan had won the approval of the district court and a unanimous 
circuit panel. 
S9. 308 U.S. at 11S. 
60. Case was argued October 18, 1939, and decided on November 6, 1939. The Chandler 
Act, repealing § 77B and replacing it with Chapter X, was adopted June i2, 1938. See Chandler 
Act, ch. S7S, S2 Stat. 883 (1938). 
61. See Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 8S (1942). 
62. 312 U.S. SlO (1941). 
63. 312 U.S. at S2S-27. 
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obvious. If the creditors hold claims worth $10 and the debtor is 
worth $8, then it violates the absolute priority rule to leave any inter-
est with the debtor; if the debtor is worth $12, then it does not. Never-
theless, this obvious truth seems to have eluded a number of the earlier 
courts. Consolidated Rock Products also established that the criterion 
of "value" for purposes of the rule was not merely the value of the 
enterprise in liquidation. Rather, it was the (presumably higher) value 
of the business as a going concern. 64 Though conceptually irrelevant 
to the new value approach, and discredited as a matter of congres-
sional intent, the going concern concept would buttress the Eighth 
Circuit's finding of new value in Ahlers. Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court rejected this thinking. 6s 
The Court thus established absolute priority as the ruling principle 
in Chapter X. 66 That would have finished the story (until the coming 
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978) except that Chapter X was not the 
only pre-1978 source of reorganization law. Rather, there were- in-
deed there long had been - two separate strains of reorganization 
law, existing side-by-side in uneasy harness. One evolved from the law 
of equity receivership and crystallized in Chapter X, as just described. 
The other grew out of the common law remedy of composition, 
whereby creditors and debtor together agree to "compose" - or scale 
down - the debtor's debts. A common law composition might be 
binding on all creditors who agreed to it, but it was not binding on 
dissenters. As early as 1874, American bankruptcy law provided a 
scheme whereby a compromise accepted by a majority of creditors 
might be binding on all, including dissenters.67 In 1938, Congress ac-
knowledged this tradition by embodying it in Chapter XI of the Chan-
64. 312 U.S. at 525-27. On the content of the valuation, see infra Part III.B. See generally 
Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C. L. 
REV. 925, 938-44 (1980). 
· 65. See infra Part III.C.3. 
66. A summary of the "fair and equitable" rule under Chapter X is in 6A COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY~ 11.06 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1977). The rule was also applied to railroad reorgani-
zations under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (repealed 1978); Group of Institu-
tional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); to 
recapitalizations under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k(e) 
(1982); and to registered investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1970, 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-25(c) (1982). But the Court's firm stand did not resolve all problems over the 
application of the absolute priority rule. In particular, the rule did nothing to resolve important 
questions such as the valuation of claims. See generally Billyou, supra note 51; Billyou, ''New 
Directions'': A Further Comment, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1954); Blum, The ''New Directions" 
for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1954). 
67. See Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, 182-86 (amending the Bankruptcy Act of 
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99). For sources on 
the history of composition law, see J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY§ 309 (1956). See also Rie-
senfeld, The Evolution of Modem Bankruptcy Law: A Comparison of the Recent Bankruptcy Acts 
of Italy and the United States, 31 MINN. L. REv. 401, 438-52 (1947). 
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dler Act.68 
The line between "compositions" and equity receiverships had 
never been clear, but a vulgar oversimplification, adequate for present 
purposes, is that the composition cases involved small businesses and 
face-to-face dealings between owner-managers, on the one hand, and 
vendor-creditors, on the other. The receivership cases, by contrast, 
involved publicly-traded, mortgage-backed debt and limited-liability 
corporations. Perhaps more important, the cases emerged from differ-
ent cultures, each habituated to its own way of going about its task. 69 
No one can be certain of the influence that the competing principles of 
equity receivership and common law composition had upon the devel-
opment of absolute priority doctrine. It is safe to conchide, however, 
that each laid an independent foundation for .the ultimate bankruptcy 
structure. 
Under the Bankruptcy Act, the Court encountered recurrent diffi-
cu1ties over the years in. determining just which chapter was appropri-
ate for any particu1ar case.7° For our purposes, the important point is 
this: The absolute priority rule had never been a principle of.composi-
tion law.71 Quite the contrary, the point was that a creditor might be 
bound to anything he agreed to in a composition. 72 
This was part and parcel of the theory of composition: if you had 
to pay the full going concern value of the enterprise to your creditors, 
even though they might agree to accept less, composition was never 
po~sible. This might have been acceptable public policy to an enter-
prise like a publicly-held corporation, where the equity ownership 
might come and go. It was less palatable in the case of the typical 
Chapter 11 debtor - a sole proprietorship or a closely-held "family" 
corporation. 73 
68. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 912 (1938). 
69. The same kind of"different cultures" problem may account for the existence of two lines 
of absolute priority authority. 
70. See SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); General 
Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594 
(1965). 
71. For a summary of the history, together with an attack on the absolute priority rule, see J. 
MACLACHLAN, supra note 67, at §§ 323, 384-85. 
72. On the relation between common law compositions and relief in bankruptcy, see Mulder 
& Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act upon General Assignments and Compositions, 87 U. PA. L. 
REv. 763 (1939). See also Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Cred-
itors or Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. REv. 540, 549 (1973); Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 366(2), 52 
Stat. 840, 911 (1938) (amending the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544). MacLach-
lan argued that not even liquidation value was required. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 67, at 
§§ 322, 384. 
73. The objections are summarized in the committee report that led to the amendments dis-
cussed infra at note 75. See H.R. REP. No. 310, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1952). 
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The difficulty was that Chapter 11 as drafted included the "fair 
and equitable" standard which Justice Douglas, construing Chapter X 
in Case, read to mean absolute priority.74 It took an amendment to 
the Bankruptcy Act, striking the phrase "fair and equitable" from 
Chapter 11, ·to solve that problem. 75 If it were not amended, the Com-
mittee Report declared, "no individual debtor and, under chapter 11, 
no corporate debtor where the stock ownership is substantially identi-
cal with management could effectuate an arrangement except by pay-
ment of the claims of all creditors in full."76 
Against this background, Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Code 
of 1978. The Code clearly adopted a modified absolute priority rule, 
but it is crucial here to grasp not only what Congress did, but what it 
chose not to do. The fountainhead of learning that underlay the 1978 
Code was the Report of the Bankruptcy Commission, filed in 1973.77 
The Report proposed to emasculate substantially the absolute priority 
rule.78 Specifically, it would have given broad powers to the reorgani-
zation court to leave a stake with the old equity owners even though 
claims were not paid in full79 and it would have invited the court to 
fudge the question of value. 80 It would have given equity owners, even 
though their interests were eliminated in the plan, a chance to partici-
pate if the debtor's fortunes improved at any time up to five years after 
confirmation - in effect, a sort of option or warrant. 81 Additionally, 
it would have permitted individual debtors or shareholders to partici-
74. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 366(3), 52 Stat. 840, 912 (amended 1952; repealed 1978); 
United States Realty, 310 U.S. 434. Justice White mistook this point in Ahlers, apparently misled 
by the Solicitor General. He distinguished U.S. Realty because it purportedly arose under "a 
chapter of the old bankruptcy statutes under which the absolute priority rule did not apply." 108 
S. Ct. at 968 n.4. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27-28, Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (No. 86-958). At least one court had held that 
absolute priority applied in Chapter 11 just as it did in Chapter X. See Mecca Temple v. Dar-
rock, 142 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1944). 
75. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1952) (repealed 1978). Parallel 
amendments solved a parallel problem under Chapters 11 and 13. See Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 
579, §§ 43, 50, 66 Stat. 420, 435, 437 (repealed 1978). The history of "fair and equitable" in 
Chapter 11 can be found in IA CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 9.18 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978). 
76. H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1960, 1982 (1952). 
77. REPORT OF THE COMMN. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. 
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The report contains three parts. Part I is a text 
summary of recommendations and support [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. Part II is a pro-
posed bill [hereinafter the COMMISSION BILL]. Part III is a selection of studies prepared for the 
Commission. 
78. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 277. One of the Commission's consultants 
defended its position. See Trost, supra note 72. 
79. A critic stated that "the Commission both proclaims its attachment to the absolute prior-
ity rule and proposes effectively to abolish the rule." Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's 
Proposed ''Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 308 (1974). 
80. CoMMISSION BILL, supra note 77, at 254-55 (notes to§ 7-310(d)(2)(B)). 
81. COMMISSION BILL, supra note 77, at 241 (§ 7-303(3)). 
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pate in any event, if the court found that they would make an "impor-
tant" contribution to the reorganized enterprise. 82 
The Commission proposal met with adverse criticism in the law 
reviews, 83 and in due course Congress abandoned it in favor of the 
present scheme. That present scheme, in effect, adopts the absolute 
priority rule as a "default" or "off-the-rack" standard, but permits 
waiver by consent. It provides that any individual may block confir-
mation unless he gets at least what he would get in liquidation. 84 Sub-
ject to this limitation, it provides that a plan may be binding on any 
class of creditors if it is accepted by more than half in number, and at 
least two thirds in amount, of that class. 85 
That is the state of the "statutory" branch of absolute priority doc-
trine at the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. But 
before continuing the story from there, it is necessary to discuss our 
second source of absolute priority law - the Constitution. In Part 
III, I discuss both the statutory and constitutional principles relating 
to absolute priority and its new value corollary. 
2. The Constitutional Line 
a. Radford and the Wrights. The following discussion traces 
the constitutional history of the absolute priority rule from the time of 
its birth to its apparent demise during the New Deal, and its reputed 
reappearance six years ago. Central to the discussion is the relation of 
absolute priority to the takings clause of the fifth amendment. Bank-
ruptcy clause, states' rights, and contracts clause issues, while of ancil-
lary significance to the constitutional rule of absolute priority, are also 
discussed. 
In a seminal analysis, Bonbright and Bergerman stressed that 
resistance to absolute priority law comes from an effort by debtors to 
retain their property without paying their debts. The irony was not 
lost on them, as they remarked: 
To anyone familiar merely with the ordinary law of priorities as applied 
to individual debtors and creditors, and to house and lot mortgages, it 
would come as a surprise to learn that there can be any uncertainty as to 
the fundamental legal principles underlying the priority rights of the dif-
ferent classes of security holders enumerated above. 86 
Their comment sets the stage for a discussion of the "constitutional" 
82. COMMISSION BILL, supra note 77, at 242 (§ 7-303(4)). 
83. See, e.g., Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651 (1974); Brudney, supra note 79: 
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (1982). 
85. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129(a)(8) (1982). 
86. Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 42, at 129. 
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branch of absolute priority law. This branch is rooted in the recurrent 
war between the Supreme Court on the one hand and Congress or the 
states on the other, with the Court policing supposedly undesirable 
economic legislation. 87 "Debtor relief" legislation, however defined, 
intensifies this conflict; witness the repeated challenges to the constitu-
tionality of debtor relief laws during the Great Depression. 
The central episode is the case of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank 
v. Radford. 88 The Court had to consider the Frazier-Lemke Act, 89 a 
farm mortgage relief bill passed by Congress in 1934. Frazier-Lemke 
offered farm debtors a five-year moratorium on foreclosure, with the 
power to buy the farm property at its "appraised" value - i.e., below 
the debt.90 To readers acquainted with Ahlers and its ancestors, the 
facts of Radford bear a familiar ring. The Radfords borrowed $9,000 
at six percent from the bank, secured by a mortgage on farmland 
"then presumably of the appraised value of at least $18,000."91 After 
the Radfords fell behind in their payments, the bank began a foreclo-
sure, prompting the Radfords to file for relief under Frazier-Lemke.92 
Frazier-Lemke gave the debtor a right to stay in possession of his 
property for up to five years on payment of "a reasonable rental," the 
proceeds to be distributed to creditors.93 At or prior to the end of five 
years, he might acquire title and possession if he paid the appraised 
value of the property.94 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Brandeis held the Act unconstitutional as a denial of the creditor's 
property right, guaranteed under the fifth amendment.95 
87. For a particularly vivid, if partisan, account of this controversy, see R. JACKSON, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941). 
88. 295 U.S. 555 (1935), 
89. The Act amended the Bankruptcy Act by adding subsection (s) to § 75. Pub. L. No. 73-
486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (amende.d 1935). Frazier-Lemke expired on March 1, 1949. See Act of 
Apr. 21, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-495, 62 Stat. 198. 
90. Pub. L. No. 73-486, § 75(s)(7), 48 Stat. 1289, 1291 (1934). 
91. Radford, 295 U.S. at 573. The bank was authorized to make individual loans in amounts 
not to exceed 50% of the value of the land and 20% of the value of the improvements. 
92. Radford, 295 U.S. at 573~75. 
93. Pub. L. No. 73-486, § 75(s)(7), 48 Stat. 1289, 1291 (1934). 
94. Pub. L. No. 73-486, § 75(s)(7), 48 Stat. 1289, 1291 (1934). , 
95. Radford, 295 U.S. at 602. Professor Rogers correctly stresses that Radford focused on 
the fact that Frazier-Lemke allowed a retroactive modification of rights. Rogers, The Impair-
ment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the 
Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973,.985 (1983). In light of this 
fact, he concludes that "none of the Frazier-Lemke Act cases provides any support whatsoever 
for the proposition that fifth amendment property-protection concepts limit the substantive scope 
of the bankruptcy power." Id. It is not clear what he means here. lfhe means that Radford says 
nothing at all about prospective application, he is probably right. But Radford seems to say that 
the fifth amendment trumps the bankruptcy power when the issue applies retroactively, His 
mistake seems to be in assuming that a statute, invalid in retroactive application only, cannot also 
be a property-rights limitation on the bankruptcy power. There is no apparent justification for 
April 1989] Rethinking Absolute Priority 981 
Striking down the Act, Justice Brandeis identified five items that 
he characterized as "property rights recognized by the Laws of Ken-
tucky. "96 They were the right (1) to retain a lien until paid; (2) to 
have a public judicial sale; (3) to determine when sale shall be held 
(subject only to the discretion of the court); (4) to bid at the sale; and 
(5) to control the property during the default, subject to the discretion 
of the court, and to have the rents and profits collected by a receiver 
for the creditor's benefit. The Court held that Frazier-Lemke denied 
all of these. 97 
Prior to the decision, Frazier-Lemke had been something of a 
political sideshow in the theater of the New Deal. President Roosevelt 
had signed the bill, but it was not an administration measure.98 Nev-
ertheless, an onslaught of pressure from desperate farmers over-
whelmed Congress, as Frazier-Lemke took the center stage of the 
debtor relief agenda. Some of the heat is reflected in the remarks of 
Representative Truax in the debate over the original Act: 
When this law becomes effective I can but wonder what will become of 
the ruthless money lender when the breath of gold leaves his feculent 
body and a financial death stops the rattling of his grasping brain, for he 
is unfit for the higher realm of life, and too foul for the one below. He 
cannot be buried in the earth, lest he provoke a pestilence; nor in the sea, 
lest he poison the fish; nor swing in space like Mahomet's coffin, lest the 
circling worlds in trying to avoid contamination, crash together, wreck 
the universe, and bring again the noisome reign of chaos and Satan.99 
Complicating the political dynamic was the fact that Radford was an-
nounced on "Black Monday" - May 27, 1935, the day that also saw 
the invalidation of two other initiatives, both central to the New 
Deal.100 In this charged climate, Cbngress almost immediately under-
took to revise Frazier-Lemke; a new version won approval just three 
months later, on August 28 (hereinafter referred to as "Frazier-Lemke 
such an assumption. For still another approach to Radford, see Carlson, Post Petition Interest 
Entitlements Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. (1988) (forthcoming).· 
96. Radford, 295 U.S. at 594. 
97. 295 U.S. at 594. 
98. See K. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933-1937, at 514-15 (1986); N. DAW-
SON, LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW DEAL 127 (1980); A. SCHLES-
INGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE PoLmcs OF UPHEAVAL 280 (1960). It was largely the 
handiwork of William Lemke, North Dakota Congressman and in 1936 himself a third-party 
candidate for President. On Lemke, see generally E. BLACKORBY, PRAIRIE REBEL (1963), 
which, however, adds little or nothing to the specific history of Frazier-Lemke. 
99. 78 CONG. REC. 11,923 (June 15, 1934). 
100. See generally R. JACKSON, supra note 87, at 106-14. The other two cases were 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (invalidating the President's power 
to remove an FTC commissioner) and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act). 
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II"; 101 the original will be referred to as Frazier-Lemke I). 
This time in Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank 
("Wright I'') 102 the Court, again speaking thrpugh Justice Brandeis, 
unanimously upheld the Act. Wright I's facts were distressingly fa-
miliar. Wright mortgaged his farm to the bank. The bank undertook 
to foreclose, and he filed for relief under Frazier-Lemke II. In the 
ensuing contest over constitutionality, all parties agreed that the mort-
gagee in Virginia enjoyed the same five "property rights" that the 
Kentucky mortgagee enjoyed in Radford. But early on, Justice Bran-
deis carved out some room to maneuver in evaluating the revised Act. 
"It was not held," he declared, "that the deprivation of any one of 
these rights would have rendered the Act invalid, but that the effect of 
the statute in its entirety was to deprive the mortgagee of his property 
without due process of law."103 Translated, this means: Frazier-
Lemke II does violate at least one of the five rights enumerated in 
Radford, but we are going to uphold it anyway. Justice Brandeis went 
on to state that "[i]t is not denied that the new Act adequately pre-
serves three of the five above enumerated rights of a mortgagee."104 
These were the right to retain the lien until paid (number (1) above); 
the right to a judicial public sale (number (2) above); and the right to 
bid in at sale (number (4) above). That left items (3) (to determine 
when the sale was held) and (5) (control during default; rents for 
mortgagee's benefit). 
The nub of the matter turned out to be item (3). 105 The Act pro-
vided, in essence, for a three-year moratorium on foreclosure. If it 
meant what it seemed to say, Justice Brandeis reasoned, then it was 
clear that the Act deprived the creditor of the right to determine when 
the sale should be held. But, the Court found, the stay was not abso-
lute; indeed, the Act gave the courts "broad power to curtail the stay 
for the protection of the mortgagee."106 The finding of a moratorium 
subject to reduction thus transformed itself into the right to determine 
101. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 942 (1936). See generally Hanna, 
New Frazier-Lemke Act, 1 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1936); Diamond & Letzler, The New Frazier-Lemke 
Act: A Study, 37 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1092 (1937). 
102. 300 U.S. 440 (1937). Lower court judges might have felt like the little boy with the 
butter on his hat, who keeps applying the right rule to the wrong situation. Most lower court 
decisions had upheld Frazier-Lemke I, only to see the Supreme Court in Radford go the other 
way. Guided by Radford, most lower court decisions struck down Frazier-Lemke II, only to see 
their expectations dashed a second time. 
103. 300 U.S. at 457. 
104. 300 U.S. at 458. 
105. 300 U.S. at 460-64. 
106. 300 U.S. at 464. 
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when the sale should be held, and the requirement of item (3) was held 
fulfilled. 
Finally, the Court turned to item (5) (control during default): 
"The argument is that possession by the mortgagor during the stay is 
necessarily less favorable to the mortgagee than possession by a re-
ceiver or trustee would be."107 The Court went straight to the point: 
"This is not true."108 In fact, Justice Brandeis reasoned, the mortga-
gor remained at all times under the supervision and control of the 
court. There is undoubtedly room for argument over the clarity and 
consistency of the doctrine created by Radford and Wright L But 
there can be no doubt that the opinion is a Brandeis tour de force. 
Frazier-Lemke II was different from Frazier-Lemke I, particularly in-
sofar as it gave the creditor the power to demand a sale. But the fact is 
that, under both versions, the creditor was barred from foreclosure for 
long periods of time, during which the debtor remained in possession, 
. obliged to pay over no more than what the property, after necessary 
expenses, would yield. 109 
The suspicion is that the Court had not so much seen the light as 
felt the heat. This was,. by any measure, one of the most explicitly 
"political" periods in the history of the Court. Two relevant events 
intervened between Radford and Wright L One was President 
Roosevelt's landslide reelection in 1936, where he carried all but two 
states. The other was the advent of President Roosevelt's campaign to 
finesse a hostile judiciary by enlarging membership on the Supreme 
Court, memorialized in history books as the "court-packing plan."110 
Roosevelt began the campaign with his message to Congress on 
February 5, 1937, recommending the reorganization of the judicial 
branch. 111 The Supreme Court decided Wright I less than two 
months later, on "White Monday," March 29, 1937.112 For the Court 
it was a period of repentance on many fronts. 
Further decisions undercut Radford still more. In Wright v. Union 
107. 300 U.S. at 466. 
108. 300 U.S. at 466. 
109. Hanna and MacLachlan declare that "[s]ubsequent lower court cases indicate that total 
delays of six to eight years are not uncommon before the mortgagee is permitted to realize upon 
his security." J. HANNA & J. MACLACHLAN, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND CoRPORATE REOR-
GANIZATION 302 (consol. 5th ed. 1957). 
110. See generally A. COPE, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1952). 
111. H.R. Doc. No. 142, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 81 CONG. REc. 893 (1937). 
112. R. JACKSON, supra note 87, at 207-13. Other decisions that same day upheld a mini-
mum wage law, see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), railway collective 
bargaining, Virginian Ry. v. System Fedn. No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), and the taxation of 
firearms, Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). 
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Central Life Insurance Co. ("Wright II") 113 the Court had occasion to 
speak on the constitutionality of the "extension" aspect of Frazier-
Lemke II; it found the extension provision was constitutional. Arriv-
ing on the heels of Wright I, the result can hardly have come as a 
surprise, although the strategy will get a moment's notice later. 114 In 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels, 115 the•Court con-
sidered a provision permitting early termination of the stay. In Wright 
I, Justice Brandeis had said that Frazier-Lemke II provided for early 
termination, but Bartels held that it did not. 116 
Finally, one year later, in Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance 
Co. ("Wright Ill''), 117 the debtor sought to purchase the property at 
its appraised value; the secured creditor sought to insist on his right of 
sale. This right of sale was item (3) in Justice Brandeis' catalog of 
rights in Wright L In that case, Justice Brandeis had made it clear 
that the presence of the right of sale was a critical distinction between 
(constitutional) Frazier-Lemke II and its (unconstitutional) predeces-
sor. The Court in Wright Ill, this time speaking through Justice 
Douglas, conceded that there was a right of sale in Frazier-Lemke 
II.118 But Justice Douglas pointed out that the right of sale and the 
right of redemption appeared to trump each other. In that event, Jus-
tice Douglas said, the debtor wins. He said Frazier-Lemke II pro-
vided "safeguards" to protect the value of the secured creditor's 
interest in the property. He stated: "There is no constitutional claim 
of the creditor to more than that."119 Indeed, he said that a decision 
for the creditor would bar the debtor from "equal protection" -
though he did not specify whether he was talking about constitutional 
equal protection or some more evanescent right. 120 
b. The constitutional doctrine of absolute priority today. In Wright 
Ill, Justice Douglas drew the teeth from Justice Brandeis' analysis; 
when the dust settled, debtors and creditors found themselves pretty 
113. 304 U.S. 502 (1938). But the earlier Union Central case has no relevance to this 
account. 
114. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
115. 308 U.S. 180 (1939). 
116. See Wright l 300 U.S. at 462; Bartels, 308 U.S. at 184 & n.3. 
117. 311 U.S. 273 (1940). Both Union Central cases (Wright II and Wright III) involved the 
same parties; Vinton Branch (Wright I) involved a different Wright and a different bank. 
118. 311 U.S. at 277-79. Justice Brandeis resigned February 13, 1939; Justice Douglas was 
confirmed as his successor April 4, 1939. L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 
(1985). 
119. 311 U.S. at 278. 
120. 311 U.S. at 279. 
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much where they were before the Court decided Radford, given that 
one would have concluded in 1940 that the Wrights overruled it. 
Today, can we conclude that because Ahlers was entirely "statu-
tory," lacking any trace of Radford-based constitutional doctrine, that 
the constitutional branch is dead? The answer seems to be "no": The 
constitutional branch is not dead; it is only sleeping - and sleeping 
rather fitfully, at that. Supporting the idea that the constitutional doc-
trine is dead, I have already noted that the Supreme Court had a gen-
erally distasteful experience applying constitutional doctrine to 
bankruptcy cases in the Great Depression. These highly salient con-
stitutional postures proved indefensible, and inglorious retreats fol-
lowed. The superabundance of doctrine suggests a bewilderment on 
the Court's part as to just how to proceed. Indeed, the experience of 
the 1930s seemed more than enough to justify the views of the leading 
bankruptcy historian, who wrote when the process was only half be-
gun: "The trail of [the bankruptcy clause], is strewn with a host of 
unsuccessful objections based on constitutional grounds against the 
enactment of various provisions, all of which are now regarded as per-
fectly orthodox features of a bankruptcy law."121 
Constitutional doctrine? Who needs it! All it brings is trouble and 
strife. This analysis gains plausibility from the insight that the facts of 
Ahlers are, after all, far closer to Radford than they are to Case. A 
more cautious position would be that Ahlers proves nothing about the 
survival of constitutional absolute priority doctrine because the Court 
customarily avoids constitutional issues when it can, and there were 
entirely adequate reasons to resolve Ahlers on a statutory basis.122 Or 
the Court may simply not have grasped that there was any constitu-
tional substrate to work on here. Thus, silence alone does nothing to 
justify constitutional agnosticism. In fact, there are good reasons for 
believing that constitutional absolute priority doctrine is alive and 
ready to rise again. Wright Ill however restrictive, still subsists as 
121. c. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISrORY 9 (1935). Warren is referring, 
of course, specifically to the bankruptcy clause - as well he might have, prior to Radford. But 
the comment seems justified even more strongly by the later record of the Supreme Court, where 
the Court deployed due process (both "property" and "contract") as well as states' rights in 
evaluating bankruptcy law. See infra at Part 11.B.d. 
122. The classic statement of the strategies for avoiding constitutional questions is, of course, 
from a concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). Not the least of the ironies in this account is that the author of the 
concurrence is Justice Brandeis. On the theory set forth in the text above, the real test of consti-
tutionality would arise if anyone had tried to raise a constitutional challenge to Chapters 12 or 13 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which clearly do permit the debtor to retain his property while leaving 
his creditors less than fully compensated. Justice White seems to have assumed that these are 
constitutional, see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text, and the chances are he is right. But 
of course the issue was not squarely before him. 
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constitutional doctrine, largely unchallenged. 123 And Radford, how-
ever emasculated, has never been expressly overruled.124 Quite the 
contrary; just recently Radford, in the hands of then Justice Rehn-
quist, has proven to have an extraordinary vitality. Justice Rehnquist 
used Radford to build his argument in at least two important recent 
cases. One of them need not concern us now,125 but in the other, 
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 126 decided just seven years 
ago, Radford played a critical motivational role, like the ghost of old 
King Hamlet, who makes a sinister entry to get the action going and 
then remains as a haunting presence throughout the rest of the drama. 
Security Industrial Bank concerned a novel "consumer protection" 
provision in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.127 This provision permitted 
an individual debtor to invalidate certain liens on consumer goods. 
The question was whether the statute might be applied retroactively 
- that is, whether the debtor could invoke the statute to avoid liens 
granted before the enactment of the Code. All Justices agreed that it 
could not be applied retroactively, and all confined the issue to con-
struing the statute. But there the agreement ended. Justice Black-
mun, writing for himself and two others, held that the rule of 
construction had been set down in an earlier case, "and, unless the 
Court chooses to overrule it, [it] must control the present case."128 
But he said that were he writing on a clean slate, he would do 
otherwise.129 
123. Patrick Murphy wrote a pair of articles in the 1970s which proved highly influential in 
defining the structure of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Murphy treats Wright III as central to the 
constitutional structure of bankruptcy law. See Murphy, Use of Collateral in Business Rehabili-
tations: A Suggested Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63 CALIP. L. 
REV. 1483, 1491 (1975); Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reor· 
ganization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15, 24-26 (1974). 
124. The Supreme Court itself once said that it might have fallen into error in Radford and 
corrected itself in Wright l although the Court now seems to have abandoned that position also. 
Professor Countryman also argues that Radford died with Wright L Countryman, Real Estate 
Liens in Business Rehabilitation Cases, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 335-36 (1976); Countryman, 
Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 CoM. L.J. 349, 357-60 (1977). 
125. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), whose implications are spelled out in 
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1982). 
126. 459 U.S. 70 (1982). 
127. 459 U.S. at 71; 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1982). 
128. 459 U.S. at 85 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
129. 459 U.S. at 83. Justice Blackmun offered an intriguing catalog of reasons why it would 
be proper to apply it retroactively: 
I would do so because the exemptions in question are limited as to kinds of property and as 
to values; because the amount loaned has little or no relationship to the value of the prop-
erty; because these asserted lien interests come close to being contracts of adhesion; because 
repossessions by small loan companies in this kind of situation are rare; because the purpose 
of the statute is salutary and is to give the debtor a fresh start with a minimum for necessi-
ties; because there has been creditor abuse; because Congress merely has adjusted priorities, 
and has not taken for the Government's use or for public use; because the exemption provi-
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, took the statutory path to 
avoid what he took to be a constitutional problem. He stated that he 
found "substantial doubt whether the retroactive destruction of the 
appellees' liens in this case comports with the Fifth Amendment."130 
The constitutional authority was, of course, Radford. 
Justice Rehnquist's analysis of Radford is remarkable in a number 
of respects. As a threshold matter, he recognized and embraced the 
contract/property distinction that got such inconsistent handling in 
the Depression-era case law. He conceded that the Court had "regu-
larly construed" the bankruptcy power "to authorize the retrospective 
impairment of contractual obligations."131 But he stated that this con-
cession "does not ... obviate the additional difficulty that arises when 
that power is sought to be used to defeat traditional property inter-
ests." 132 He continued: "The bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition against taking private property without 
compensation," citing, of course, Radford.133 . 
Justice Rehnquist went on to declare that the Frazier-Lemke Act 
in Radford "permitted the debtor to purchase the property for less 
than its fair market value."134 A footnote at that point explains that 
the Act permitted the farmer "to purchase the property at its then-
appraised value on a deferred payment plan."135 In fact, the statutory 
interest on the deferred payments was 1 % per year. Justice Rehnquist 
states that "[g]iven the [statutory] interest ~ate of 1 %, the present 
value of the deferred payments was much less than the value of the 
property."136 Apparently, he reasonably assumed that 1 % was less 
than the market rate. On the other hand, by relying so heavily on the 
below-market statutory interest rate, Justice Rehnquist appears to re-
ject the notion that appraised value is per se different from market 
sions in question affect the remedy and not the debt; because the security interest seems to 
have little direct value and weight in its own right and appears useful mainly as a convenient 
tool with which to threaten the debtor to reaffirm the underlying obligation; because the 
statute is essentially economic regulation and insubstantial at that; and because there is an 
element of precedent favorable to the debtor to be found in such cases as Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
130. 459 U.S. at 78. 
131. 459 U.S. at 74. 
132. 459 U.S. at 75. As if to allay any misunderstanding, he later wrote: "our cases recog-
nize, as did the common law, that the contractual right of a secured creditor to obtain repayment 
of his debt may be quite different in legal contemplation from the property_ right of the same 
creditor in the collateral." 459 U.S. at 75.-
133. 459 U.S. at 75. 
134. 459 U.S. at 76. It is better to abandon the distinction between Frazier-Lemke I and 
Frazier-Lemke II here; Justice Rehnquist never hints that there was a Frazier-Lemke II. 
135. 459 U.S. at 76 n.7. 
136. 459 U.S. at 77 n.7. 
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value.131 
But all this is a distraction because the process he described is en-
tirely voluntary: the creditor did not have to accept any part of it (just 
as, presumably, he might have arranged any other compromise with 
the debtor that he chose to arrange).138 Justice Rehnquist continued: 
If the mortgagee refused to assent, the court was required to stay all 
proceedings for five years, during which time the farmer could retain 
possession by paying a reasonable rent. After five years the property 
could be reappraised, but the farmer still had the right to purchase it free 
and clear for the appraised value regardless of the amount of the lien.139 
This is all very well as far as it goes, but it ignores the fact that this is 
essentially the same process the Court later validated in the two 
Wright cases. The only obvious difference is that the "nominal" mora-
torium term was five years in Radford but only three years in Wright 
L Justice Rehnquist doesn't mention that fact. Indeed, he doesn't cite 
any Wright case, or give any hint that Radford has been substantially 
defanged. 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion is remarkable in at least two respects: 
one is its sheer gratuity, given the availability of the statutory argu-
ment (upon which, of course, he ultimately relied). The other is his 
highly selective reading of Radford, giving no hint of the ways in 
which it was impaired in its own time. Under the circumstances, it 
would be foolhardy to say that "constitutional" absolute priority is 
dormant, and awaiting its hour of need. On the other hand, if this was 
Justice Rehnquist's intention, his view has met with a spectacular lack 
of success. On at least two occasions last Term, the Supreme Court 
dealt with bankruptcy issues that invited treatment in the "constitu-
tional" tradition. In United Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood 
137. There are, however, at least three possible reasons why he might want to assert that 
appraised value does not equal market value. First, it might be that appraisers will consistently 
undervalue farm property. This is not inconceivable, though it is hardly a self-evident proposi-
tion. Second, it is arguable that anytime the creditor wishes to bid higher than the appraisal, 
then the appraisal is too low. This is beguiling, but it ignores the fact that the creditor is "credit-
bidding." That is, at any bid up to the amount of the loan, the creditor parts with no cash: he 
simply writes off the corresponding portion of the loan. Faced with a debtor who will not be able 
to pay any deficiency claim, a creditor might well "credit bid" up to the full amount of his loan, 
just to give himself the option of holding the property for resale in a higher market. The third 
possibility is the mirror image of the second. That is, one might argue that anytime the debtor 
wants to keep the property while paying less than the full amount of the loan, he is admitting 
that the property is worth something beyond what the creditor is getting. This is essentially the 
position embraced by Justice White, rejecting the "no value" argument in Ahlers. See also infra 
text accompanying notes 253-57. 
138. Presumably there may have been a residual problem with the supposed contractual rule 
of Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884), although courts even by the middle 1930s were 
showing ample ingenuity in evading the rule. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. Beall, 107 S.W.2d 456 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937). 
139. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. at 76-77 n.7. 
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Forest, Ltd., 140 the issue was whether the law required the debtor to 
compensate the secured creditor for delay caused by the automatic 
stay. The facts of the case put it squarely in the tradition of "morato-
rium" lore, where cases like Blaisdell and Wright II (to say nothing of 
Radford) provided a ready body of constitutional precedent. But the 
Court chose not to invoke this constitutional authority.141 Ahlers was 
of course the other case. 
c. The demise of property as possession. . Aside from its signifi-
cance in its own right, the Radford-Wright group of cases stands as a 
chapter in a larger chronicle concerning the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of "property rights" in debtor- creditor cases. Blackstone, in a 
memorable remark, described property as "sole and despotic domin-
ion."142 As rhetorical flourishes go, this was probably never entirely 
wrong, but from the start it was at least misleading. It ignored the 
whole history of mortgage law as an effort to restrain the powers of the 
"proprietary" creditor claimant against the debtor. And it said noth-
ing about t}le priority struggle between the "original owner" and the 
"bona fide purchaser."143 The history of Supreme Court bankruptcy 
doctrine discloses a trajectory, however halting, toward "monetizing" 
the claim of the secured creditor. This involved, first, breaking the 
nexus between "property" and "possession," and, second, establishing 
that what the secured creditor "owned" was not a particular piece of 
property but a claim to a particular sum of money, however defined. 
Wright Ill is the keystone of this arch, holding that the secured 
creditor has a right to no more than payment of his claim or the value 
of his collateral, whichever is less. At an earlier time, it probably was 
thought that the bankruptcy court had no power at all to deal with 
"property" of a person other than the debtor, including the secured 
creditor.144 But in 1931, the Supreme Court held that where the 
trustee obtained "possession" of the secured creditor's collateral, the 
140. 108 s. Ct. 626 (1988). 
141. Indeed, the Court's avoidance of constitutional doctrine in Timbers is probably more 
remarkable than it is in Ahlers. Ahlers was a maverick, but Timbers represented an issue on 
which there was a sharp split in the circuits, and an extensive literature. 
142. "[T]he right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other indi-
vidual in the universe." 2 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (1776). 
143. This progress can be understood as a variant of the process, independent of bankruptcy, 
whereby the claim of the "original owner" came to yield to the claim of the "good faith pur-
chaser." The process is outlined in a brilliant, seminal article by Professor Gilmore. See Gil-
more, The Commercial Doctrine of Good-Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954). 
144. Persistence of this notion would account for the fact that the Bankruptcy Code today 
makes no explicit provision for the superior priority of secured creditors; it is one of those things 
that is the law because everyone knows it is the law, even though the Code does not say it. 
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trustee might retain it in order to superintend the liquidation, all sub-
ject to the secured creditor's claim.145 The same year, the Court held 
that the bankruptcy court had no power to interfere with a secured 
creditor who had beguri his liquidation before the bankruptcy. 146 But 
just four years later (in the same Term as Radford), the Court held 
that it was proper to enjoin a pledgee from selling securities that were 
in his possession prior to bankruptcy (at least in a corporate reorgani-
zation).147 The leap to Wright Ill was not a great leap, provided one 
ignores some of Justice Brandeis' rhetoric in Radford and Wright L 
Insofar as these cases break the nexus between possession and 
property, they find their modem exemplar in United States v. Whiting 
Pools, 148 where the Court ordered the Internal Revenue Service, as a 
repossessing creditor, to return collateral to the bankruptcy estate. In-
sofar as they represent the idea of "monetizing" the secured claim, the 
logic of these cases is woven into the fabric of the present Bankruptcy 
Code.149 
d. Other constitutional strategies. Farm bankruptcy was not the 
Court's only debtor-relief problem in the Great Depression. More-
over, the "property rights" analysis of Radford and the Wright cases 
did not represent the Court's only doctrinal approach. Quite the con-
trary, the Court encountered a variety of debtor-relief problems em-
ploying an almost embarrassing array of strategies.1so 
Paralleling its foray into farm bankruptcy, the Court sought to ar-
ticulate standards for municipal debt relief. And here again, the Court 
first asserted itself by occupying a position that it found almost imme-
diately to be untenable. Thus on May 25, 1936, just a year after Rad-
ford, the Court struck down the Municipal Bankruptcy Act. 151 That 
law authorized the federal courts to enforce composition agreements 
145. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931). See also Van Huffel v. 
Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931) (court may order property sold free and clear ofliens, with liens 
attaching to proceeds). 
146. Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931) (creditor may continue foreclosure begun before 
bankruptcy). 
147. Continental Illinois Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 294 
U.S. 648, 675-78 (1935). 
148. 462 U.S. 198 (1983). 
149. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-64, 506 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
338-40 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Com;: CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963; s. REP. No. 989, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 53-54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
5787. 
150. Failure to recognize the plenitude of debtor-relief problems and strategies is a shortcom· 
ing of Professor Rogers' generally excellent review of the bankruptcy clause in competition with 
the fifth amendment. See Rogers, supra note 95. 
151. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 294 U.S. 513 (1936). 
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between municipalities and their creditors. If accepted by creditors 
holding two thirds of the indebtedness, the composition would also be 
enforced on the dissenting minority. The Act, however, permitted 
only voluntary petitions; no municipality could apply for relief unless 
authorized by the laws of the state in which it was situated. Neverthe-
less the Court held, 5-4, that the law invaded the states' rights. Two 
years later, however, an almost imperceptibly different version of the 
Act won the Court's approval, 7-2.152 
The Court also evaluated bankruptcy law by a direct application of 
the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution. Thus, in Continental Illi-
nois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railroad, 153 the Court held that a corporate reorganization statute 
was a proper exercise of the bankruptcy power granted to Congress by 
the Constitution. There must be some constitutional limitation under 
the bankruptcy clause, however, as a matter of logical necessity; else· 
Congress could do anything it wished, simply by purporting to invoke 
the bankruptcy power. On the other hand, the Court was never suc-
cessful in finding any important limitation in the bankruptcy clause, 
and it has been no more so lately.154 
Though it did not involve the Federal bankruptcy power, the 
Court faced a similar problem in evaluating state laws attempting to 
give debtor relief. The Constitution provides that no state shall pass 
any law impairing the obligation of contract.155 In Home Building 
and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 156 the Court upheld a Minnesota 
152. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). While the Court examined the state's-
rights issue, it ignored another, arguably more novel, feature of the Act. That is, the discharge 
was virtually the only substantive provision of the Act. There was no method for liquidation of 
the assets, nor was there any mechanism for court control of the estate. Thus the Act added an 
important new dimension to the notion of "bankruptcy" as the term is used in article I, section 8 
of the Constitution. See generally Dimock, Legal Problems of Financially Emba"assed Munici-
palities, 22 VA. L. REV. 39 (1935); Note, The Constitutionality of the Municipal Debt Readjust-
ment Act, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 428 (1935); Note, Administration of Municipal Credit,' 43 YALE 
L.J. 924 (1934). 
153. 294 U.S. 648 (1935). The particular issue in Continental Illinois was the power of the 
state to enjoin pledgees. See supra text accompanying note 148. But Justice Sutherland first 
considered the constitutionality of the statute and held that it was constitutional. 294 U.S. at 
671-75. Ashton, 294 U.S. 513, the first municipal bankruptcy case, can also be read as a bank-
ruptcy clause case, insofar as it holds that the tenth amendment trumps the bankruptcy clause. 
More intriguing, however, is the fact that the Court rejected an invitation to hold Ashton as 
violative of the bankruptcy clause on its own terms. 
154. The Court did, of course, make one important excursion in search of the dimensions of 
bankruptcy law in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
Northern Pipeline holds that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was unconstitutional insofar as 
it granted article III jurisdiction to non-article III bankruptcy judges. It could conceivably be 
read as standing for the proposition that article III "trumps" the bankruptcy power. 
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
156. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Blaisdell did not signify clear sailing under the contracts clause. 
In W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935), the Court, distinguishing Blaisdell, held 
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mortgage moratorium statute under the contracts clause. Blaisdell 
also held that the statute did not violate the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment, applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment. 
As if to tangle the threads further, the Court in Wright II used Blais-
dell, the state case, as authority for constitutionality, rather than 
bringing it within the standards of Wright L 151 
Radford, like Continental Illinois, refused a challenge under the 
bankruptcy power (although Radford invalidated the statute under the 
fifth amendment). 158 Both Continental Illinois and Radford recog-
nized this impairment-of-contract theory. 159 They noted, correctly, 
that the impairment-of-contract clause itself did not apply to the Fed-
eral government. They held, somewhat less obviously, that nothing 
else limited the power of Congress to impair contract (as distinct from 
property) rights. 160 In any event, taken together, the Court's Depres-
sion-era bankruptcy cases represent a striking variety of efforts to ar-
ticulate a theory to control debtor-creditor law. Today, the scope of 
bankruptcy clause powers remains a mystery; there must be some con-
stitutional fences around the bankruptcy clause terrain, but they lie 
beyond current judicial horizons. Nevertheless, Congress certainly 
cannot do whatever it pleases under the rubric of the bankruptcy 
clause. On the other hand, contracts clause and state's rights chal-
lenges, at least as they concern the constitutional validity of bank-
ruptcy laws, have been entirely discredited. The foregoing discussion 
of the various other constitutional constraints dramatizes the morass 
created by ·constitutional judicial review of bankruptcy legislation. 
that a procedure for enforcing payment of benefit assessments pledged as security for municipal 
bonds was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contract. The Court stated that 
the destruction of "nearly all the incidents" making the assessments valuable as security was 
"oppressive and unnecessary.'' 295 U.S. at 62. 
157. Compare Wright IL 304 U.S. at 515, with Wright l 300 U.S. 440. 
158. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). In Radford, both 
the district court and court of appeals had held that the Frazier-Lemke Act was within the scope 
of the bankruptcy power, and the creditor made this his primary argument on appeal to the 
Supreme Court. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 74 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1935); 
In re Radford, 8 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Ky. 1934); Brief for Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank at 9-
23, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (No. 717). The Court 
rejected the "bankruptcy power" argument. 295 U.S. at 586-89. 
159. See 295 U.S. at 589; Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 680 (1935). 
160. 295 U.S. at 589; 294 U.S. at 680. Other cases decided in the same period limited the 
power of the Federal government to abrogate contracts, by a kind of"reverse incorporation" into 
the due process clause. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). See also Perry y, 
United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). Neither of these cases remains viable on its own terms. See 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984) (retroactive application of 
statutory withdrawal penalty does not violate fifth amendment due process clause); Lichter v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (collection of excessive profits on war subcontracts after rene-
gotiation does not violate fifth amendment due process property protection). 
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Under the circumstances, it is perfectly understandable that the Court 
would wish to steer safely clear of the Constitution and decide cases on 
statutory grounds; witness Ahlers. 
3. Summary - The Two Lines 
It requires no extensive analysis to recognize that the "statutory" 
doctrine of absolute priority, whose centerpiece is Case v. Los. Angeles 
Lumber Products, addresses the same problem as the "constitutional" 
line, where Radford is the centerpiece.· In e~ch case, the ultimate 
question is whether the equity owner can retain the collateral without 
discharging all of his debts. Case and Radford are alike, of course, 
insofar as they answer that question n~gatively. But it surely is a mat-
ter worthy of remark that they QO 'it with SO little recogrution of each 
other. Case, in particular, reveals no hint that there is any "constitu-
tional" overtone to its doctrine. 
Justice Brandeis, in a similar spirit, gives no hint that there is any 
relation between the claim of the bank against Radford and the claim 
of Boyd against the shareholders of the railroad. Justice Brandeis situ-
ates his doctrine m relation to the "other" body of reorganization law, 
namely, the law of composition. He conc;:edes that in a composition, a 
debtor may be able to keep his property without paying all of his debt, 
but he argues that this is so because only a majority vote effects a 
composition.161 Coming closest to the absolute priority line, he con- · 
tinues: "It is the same power, which a court of equity exercises when 
it compels dissenting creditors, in effect, to submit to a plan of reor-
ganization approved by it as beneficial and assented to by the requisite 
majority of creditors."162 Of course, Justice Brandeis can hardly be 
expected to know that the Court via Justice Douglas just five years 
later would hold that majority rule has no place in absolute priority 
doctrine. Indeed, the only modern equity receivership case that Jus-
tice Brandeis cites for his proposition is Kansas City Terminal Railway 
v. Central Union Trust Co. 163 But Justice Douglas in Case would take 
great pains to separate Kansas City from majority-rule doctrine and 
161. Radford, 295 U.S. at 585-86. Justice Brandeis refers to §§ 77 and 77B as applying the 
principle of composition. 295 U.S. at 586 n.16. Spaeth and Winks, advocating the analysis that 
became the law in Case, say that Justice Brandeis was using the term "composition" "in an 
extremely loose sense," and that "it is not one opposed to the strict priority theory." Spaeth & 
Winks, supra note 57, at 789. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 34, Louisville 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (No. 717). · 
162. Radford, 295 U.S. at 585. 
163. 271 U.S. 445 (1926). Justice Brandeis also cites Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U.S. 605 
(1879), which, of course, long predates Boyd, and so might fairly be regarded as outside the 
absolute priority arena altogether. 
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establish Case as the fountainhead of new-value lore. 164 The one place 
where absolute priority and the Constitution meet head on provides an 
ironic obligato to the whole process. The case is In re 620 Church 
Street Building Corp., 165 where the complainant was an equity owner 
who was "squeezed out" under the absolute priority rule. He argued 
that it was unconstitutional, via the absolute priority rule, to exclude 
him from continued participation of the debtor. Happily for the sake 
of consistency, the Court rejected this claim on the grounds that the 
petitioner had no value to protect.166 
"Statutory" and "constitutional" doctrine brushed against each 
other on one more occasion in the 1930s, though the terms of the en-
counter are so murky it is not entirely clear that either knew the other 
was there. The occasion was the problem of damages for the breach of 
a long-term lease where the tenant was a debtor in bankruptcy. 167 
Under traditional landlord-tenant law, the lessor had no claim for rent 
until it was due. In bankruptcy, if the lease was burdensome, the 
trustee might reject the lease, but the tenant might not forfeit his es-
tate. The practical result was that the landlord might take nothing 
from the estate, but might retain a claim against the debtor. Where 
the debtor was a liquidating corporation, that meant the landlord got 
nothing. Where the debtor was an individual or an enterprise that 
would survive the bankruptcy, that meant the debtor remained under 
the burden of the landlord's claim. An aggravating difficulty was that 
real estate values collapsed in the Great Depression, and many tenants 
found themselves liable on long-term leases where landlords' damages 
might dwarf all other claims. 
Congress responded in 1934 with compromise legislation, allowing 
the landlord's claim in bankruptcy, but subject to a cap. The language 
was scrutinized by the Supreme Court in Kuehner v. Irving Trust 
Co. 168 In Kuehner, the landlord did not contest the cap itself. He 
accepted it as a limitation of his claim against the estate, vis-a-vis other 
164. See infra at Part 111.B. 
165. 299 U.S. 24 (1936). 620 Church was the only § 77B case to reach the Supreme Court 
before Case. 
166. Justice Douglas did cite 620 Church in Case for the proposition that "stockholders and 
other junior interests may be excluded from any plan of reorganization if the court finds that the 
debtor is insolvent." 308 U.S. at 126. 
167. The history is summarized by Justice Roberts in City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving 
Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 437-42 (1937), a companion case to Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 
U.S. 445 (1937), decided the same day. A fuller treatment, with extensive citation to sources, is 
in Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916, 918-21 (2d Cir. 1944). The effort to cap the 
landlord's claim may be seen in part as an attempt to evade the absolute priority rule. See 
Douglas & Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J. 1003 (1933). 
J68. 299 U.S. 445 (1937). 
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creditors: apparently he recognized the proposition that the statute, 
even with the cap, gave him more out of the estate than he might have 
had before. He was disputing the treatment of his remaining damages, 
above the cap, vis-a-vis the reorganized debtor. He asserted that, as to 
these damages, he should have priority over the reorganized debtor. 
Justice Roberts, for the Court, ruled against the landlord. In the 
process, the Court upheld the provision as a permissible exercise of the 
bankruptcy power, and not violative of the fifth amendment. But on 
closer scrutiny, Justice Roberts' reasoning presents a number of 
problems. Justice Roberts quite clearly understood that this was what 
he was doing in reaching this conclusion, but some of his reasoning 
seems to bear no relation to the result. In particular, he didn't under-
stand the difference between the debtor and a competing creditor. 
In Radford, Justice Brandeis stated that prior to Frazier-Lemke I 
"[n]o bankruptcy act had undertaken to supply [the debtor] capital 
with which to engage in business in the future." 169 The landlord 
pointed to this language in arguing that he ought to have priority over 
the debtor. "The short answer," said Justice Roberts in response, "is 
that the object of bankruptcy laws is the equitable distribution of the 
debtor's assets amongst his creditors .... " 170 That may be a short 
answer, but not to the question asked. The landlord wasn't com-
plaining about other creditors at all; he was asserting a right as against 
the reorganized debtor. 
Justice Roberts went on to acknowledge that the bankruptcy 
power was subject to the fifth amendment. The landlord conceded 
that he had "no lien upon, or property right in, the debtor's assets." 171 
Justice Roberts next declared that there was "a significant difference 
between a property interest and a contract, since the Constitution does 
not forbid the impairment of the obligation of the latter."172 He said 
the case might "therefore be regulated by a bankruptcy law which im-
pairs the obligation of the debtor's contracts."173 But then, quite un-
expectedly, he continued: 
While, therefore, the Fifth Amendment forbids the destruction of a con-
tract it does not prohibit bankruptcy legislation affecting the creditor's 
remedy for its enforcement against the debtor's assets, or the measure of 
the creditor's participation therein, if the statutory provisions are conso-
169. Radford, 295 U.S. at 582. 
170. Kuehner, 299 U.S. at 451 (citation omitted). The sentence continues: "and the validity 
of the challenged provision must be tested by its appropriateness to that end." One page later, 
Justice Roberts speaks of "equitable distribution of those assets." 299 U.S. at 452. 
171. 299 U.S. at 451. 
172. 299 U.S. at 452. 
173. 299 U.S. at 452. 
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nant with a fair, reasonable, and equitable distribution of those assets. 174 
Up to this point, he had given no clear indication that there was any 
contracts-clause limitation in the fifth amendment at all. Apparently 
the reader was supposed to know that the impairment of a contract 
was different from the destruction of a contract, that destruction 
would not be permitted, and that impairment would be permitted if 
(perhaps only if) it is "consonant with a fair, reasonable, and equitable 
distribution of ... assets."175 Of course, as Justice Roberts had al-
ready indicated, he saw no unfairness here. That last quoted caveat 
notwithstanding, the practical result of Kuehner was to hammer home 
the principle that a property right could not be impaired in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, while a contract right was fair game. Moreover, 
because it is a contract, rather than property, apparently the landlord/ 
credit()r will indeed have to supply new capital to the debtor, Radford 
notwithstanding. In the same vein, Kuehner, though "constitution-
ally" rooted, can be understood as putting a large dent in the absolute-
priority proposition that creditors must be paid in full before the 
debtor gets anything, because it permits the debtor to reorganize and 
continue without discharging an obligation that might bind him at 
state law. Case, of course, would not be decided until three years in 
the future. 176 But Kuehner has survived virtually unchallenged in the 
current Bankruptcy Code.177 
There is one issue that might justify a distinction between "consti-
tutional" and "statutory" strategies in deciding particular cases - the 
problem of retroactivity. That is, Radford construed a "retroactive" 
statute - the most retroactive statute possible because it applied by its 
terms only to mortgages entered into before its adoption. 178 This "ret-
roactivity" problem was central to Justice Brandeis' thinking in decid-
ing Radford. 119 In the nature of things, the only way to deal with this 
kind of retroactivity problem is through constitutional interpreta-
tion.180 But the analysis is asymmetrical: you may need the Constitu-
174. 299 U.S. at 452. 
175. 299 U.S. at 452. 
176. For whatever it is worth, neither Justice Brandeis nor Justice Douglas participated in 
Kuehner. Justice Brande\s is recorded in the opinion as not participating. 299 U.S. at 456. Jus-
tice Douglas was not yet on the Court. 
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1986). Cf. Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 
916 (2d Cir. 1944). A possible defense of Kuehner might be structured around the uncertainty of 
the landlord's "actual" claim in a situation where the lease extends far into the future and the 
bankruptcy estate is to be distributed now. This problem is not, of course, restricted to land-
lords' damages; it is a problem with any long-term or contingent claim, made much more urgent 
by the greatly expanded definition of "claim" under present law. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). 
178. Frazier-Lemke I, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (expired 1949). 
179. Radford, 295 U.S. at 589. 
180. Justice Rehnquist, of course, "dealt with" the problem of retroactivity without reaching 
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tion to strike down a retroactive statute, but it does not follow that the 
Constitution is irrelevant when you uphold such a statute. The fact is 
that Radford is not the only "retroactive" case on stage. The Wright 
cases are "retroaqtive" in the same sense that Radford was: the legis-
lature purported to apply the statute to transactions entered into 
before its enactment. Yet the Wright cases do no more than gloss the 
constitutional principles of Radford. 181 
For its part, Case is somewhat more complicated, but in the end it 
fits the same analysis. The Court in Case purported to "apply" a stat-
ute.182 But to what? If the Court treated the statute as applied to the 
"composition" agreement, then it applies only prospectively. If the 
Court applied the statute to the underlying bond contract, then it was 
applied retroactively. 183 Nothing in the time sequence of Case re-
quires that it be treated as a statutory, rather than a constitutional 
case. Finally, while retroactivity may be a necessary condition of a 
constitutional problem here, the point remains. That depends on 
whether there are some "inherent" property rights in secured creditors 
which cannot be taken away even prospectively. And while the Court 
has sidestepped all opportunities to decide that question, it has never 
clearly stated that there are none.184 
These qualifications aside, why did the "statutory" and the "con-
stitutional" approaches proceed as if in separate universes? What ac-
counts for this discontinuity, whereby the Court creates two parallel 
bodies of law on the same topic? Several possibilities present them-
selves. Perhaps they are simply different cases that require different 
strategies. In this analysis, Frazier-Lemke I simply represents a fail-
ure of the legislature, compelling the Court to play the constitutional 
card, whereas nothing so drastic occurred in the development of the 
"statutory" doctrine. This cannot be rejected completely, but there is 
less merit to the proposition than might appear at first glance. Justice 
Douglas presents Case as being statutory only, but, as argued above, 
this is done largely with smoke and mirtors.185 In any event, the pred-
ecessor to Case - Boyd - was not statutory at all: Boyd involved the 
the constitutional issue; but he did so by defining the problem out of existence. See supra note 
130 and accompanying text. 
181. Rogers makes an elegant effort to disconnect Wright III from its c0nstitutional base, but 
it is against the tide of commentary. Rogers, supra note 95, at 973. 
182. Act of June 7, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-296, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912-22 (amended 1938). 
183. There remains, of course, the argument that the Court was applying the statute "retro-
actively," but only insofar as it "codified" prior law. This is attenuated enough to suggest how 
far all this must have been from Justice Douglas' mind when he wrote Case. 
184. For an introduction to the problem of uncompensated takings and contract impair-
ments, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 586-628 (2d ed. 1988). 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95. 
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Court exercising a roving commission as supervisor of the equity re-
ceivership within very loose limits, much as it does when it interprets 
the Constitution. 186 The same would be true of all other absolute pri-
ority cases, at least until the coming of reorganization statutes in the 
Great Depression. A second and more intriguing possibility is timing. 
Radford was decided in 1936, Case in 1939. By conventional under-
standing, 1937 is the year of the great doctrinal watershed in Supreme 
Court thinking - the year of the Roosevelt Court-packing bill, the 
year of Justice Roberts' apparent retreat, the year the Court ultimately 
abandoned its commitment to economic due process.187 By this read-
ing Radford stands on one side, and Case on the other, of the great 
divide. 
The retreat from economic due process might explain why Justice 
Douglas in Case insisted on a narrow statutory result for what was, 
after all, an ambitious illtrusion into bankruptcy law: he could have 
all the satisfaction of economic interference with none of the doctrinal 
embarrassment. It could equally well explain why Wright IIL though 
decided in 1940, retains a constitutional strategy: after all, it is rooted 
in, and purports to be a gloss on, Radford. 
Focusing on these decisions in terms of doctrinal history has a sur-
prising bonus, in- that it explains why Justice Brandeis laid such stress 
on the ideology of property rights in Radford. At first glance, this is 
surprising because virtually every prior inquiry into the limits of the 
bankruptcy power had turned on the bankruptcy clause. A year 
before, in evaluating a state mortgage moratorium, the Court had re-
lied on the contracts clause.188 The Court had already begun to exper-
iment with using the· contracts clause on Federal legislation.189 
Brandeis' use of the "property" approach was largely unprecedented. 
Why didn't he choose to work out Radford in contract, rather than 
property, terms? 
One possible answer is that long before he came to the Court, Jus-
tice Brandeis established his public reputation by arguing in favor of 
the judicious (if not judicial) impairment of contract. In particular, he 
was the winning counsel in Muller v. Oregon. 190 Muller is by now 
186. Indeed, the equity receivership cases are a striking instance of the Court's exercising its 
role as the oracle of"federal" commercial law under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. I (16 
Pet.) (1842) (overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
187. A summary of the doctrinal shift, with references to sources, may be found in L. TRIBE, 
supra note 184, at §§ 8-5 to 8-7. 
188. Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
189. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 
(1934). 
190. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
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almost legendary in constitutional lore:191 how the Supreme Court, in 
Lochner v. New York, 192 held that a state law limiting the working 
hours of bakers was an unconstitutional interference with freedom of 
contract; how Justice Peckham in Lochner insisted that his decision 
was based on "common understanding";193 how Oregon passed a stat-
ute undertaking to limit the working hours of women; and how Bran-
deis, then a Boston lawyer, prevailed on the Muller Court to retreat 
from Lochner and defer to the presumed reasonableness of the legisla-
tive judgment. Muller is one of the great milestones in the history of 
establishment liberalism.194 Having played so critical a role in defeat-
ing judicial interference with the "contract" judgments of the legisla-
ture, it would be at least excusable if Justice Brandeis wanted to avoid 
taking the "contract" route in striking down Frazier-Lemke I. 
It is necessary to concede, of course, that there is no hard evidence 
to support this reading, however attractive. On the other hand, there 
is at least one additional, perhaps even more plausible, explanation for 
the discontinuity between Radford and Case. That is, the two bodies 
of doctrine grew up in two separate legal cultures: two different sets of 
lawyers who dealt with two different kinds of clients. They didn't at-
tend the same summer camps or play on the same volleyball teams, · 
and no one told them that they were addressing what was, economi-
cally, the same kind of case. 
III. THE NEW VALUE RULE 
A. Stating the ''Rule" - Case Reprised 
Questions as to the existence of a new value rule and its form make 
sense only insofar as there is an absolute priority rule - after all, if 
there is no such rule, there is no need for a new value corollary be-
cause junior interests that would normally be precluded from partici-
pating in the organization could do so without the need to contribute 
new value. Therefore, the place to begin the search for a new value 
rule is in the lore of the absolute priority rule - particularly in the 
191. The canonical popular account is Mason, The Case of the Overworked Laundress, in 
QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 193 (J. Garraty rev. ed. 1987). 
192. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 343 U.S. 921 
(1952). 
193. 198 U.S. at 59. 
194. So many axioms of the establishment model are bound up in Muller that it is difficult 
even to enumerate them: the power offact; the power of the legislature to do good; the virtues of 
meliorism; the capacity of reason to prevail, even in conflict with mossbacks like the majority of 
the Lochner Court; and (surely not least) the constructive social role open to highly trained 
"technical" lawyers. It is also entertaining to memorialize Muller as an artifact from an era 
when protective legislation for women was not yet regarded as an engine of repression. 
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optmons of Justice Douglas interpreting old Section 77B and old 
Chapter X. Justice Douglas in these cases did more than just reaffirm 
(or declare) the absolute priority doctrine. He also went a long way 
toward setting out its contours and limits. Thus, for example, in Case 
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 195 Justice Douglas held that the 
absolute priority rule of Section 77B could not be overridden by a 
mere majority vote of creditors.196 In Consolidated Rock Products Co. 
v. Du Bois 197 he articulated the Court's holding that in order to imple-
ment the absolute priority rule, the reorganization court must make a 
finding as to value. More important for present purposes, in Consoli-
dated Rock, expanding on Case, he spelled out just how that valuation 
should be made. Specifically, he stated that valuation for purposes of 
the absolute priority rule should be made on the basis of the normally 
higher "going concern" value rather than the normally lower liquida-
tion value.198 Justice Douglas never fully justified this view, but he 
seemed to acknowledge that the Chapter X creditor loaned on the 
faith of the normally higher going concern value, and that if the busi-
ness is to continue after reorganization, then the creditor ought to be 
able to look to value at least equal to the value in which he had an 
interest before the reorganization.199 
The full import of this rule becomes apparent in Marine Harbor 
Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 200 another opinion by Jus-
195. 308 u.s. 106 (1939). 
196. Presumably it could be overridden by unanimous vote, but that case never presented 
itself, which is hardly surprising. After all, who would complain? 
197. 312 U.S. 510 (1941). 
198. 312 U.S. at 526. There is room for a great deal of analytic confusion in the supposed 
distinction between "going concern" and "liquidation" values. The distinction seems to be based 
on the following propositions: (1) that the assets put to use in the business are worth more for 
that purpose than they would be if sold separately; and (2) that a liquidation sale is the norm in 
bankruptcy. Each of these may be generally true in practice, but neither is necessary as a matter 
of fact. Some businesses are worth far more in liquidation than as going concerns; the Penn 
Central Railroad, for example, a disaster as an operating company, turned out to be in control of 
a highly profitable inventory of valuable real estate. See generally Brown, Introduction: A Re-
view of the Penn Central Reorganization proceeding, 36 Bus. LAWYER 1903 (1981). 
Similarly, while bankruptcy administration may be costly and inefficient, it is entirely con-
ceivable in principle that an enterprising trustee may be able to keep assets together and sell them 
at a higher price than any private liquidator may be able to do. Many confuse the going con-
cern/liquidation distinction with the quick-sale/careful-marketing distinction. The assumption 
is that a liquidation sale will be carried out "quickly," without taking time to seek out the best 
potential buyers, while a going concern sale will be carried out more carefully. But there is no 
necessity that this be so. A "careful" sale is likely to be more costly, and will be correspondingly 
inefficient if there are no buyers waiting. Finally, the distinction is often confused with the prop-
osition that only the debtor (or the principals of the debtor corporation) can maintain the going 
concern value - again a possible, but hardly a necessary, scenario. For the most part, I main-
tain the conventional usage, despite all its confusions. 
199. For a somewhat different statement of the rationale, see Pachulski, supra note 64, at 
939. . 
200. 317 U.S. 78 (1942). 
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tice Douglas. Marine Harbor owned an apartment house. Manufac-
turers Trust held the first mortgage. There were also junior mortgages 
and other claims. It was conceded that the property was worth less 
than the amount necessary to satisfy the first mortgage debt. The 
creditor started a state court foreclosure proceeding, and the debtor 
filed a Chapter X claim. The court of appeals ordered dismissal of the 
petition, holding that it had been filed only to escape the jurisdiction of 
the state court. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but rejected 
the reasoning. Justice Douglas stated that, other things being equal, it 
was entirely proper to file to escape the jurisdiction of the state court, 
but in this case, the debtor was unable to show sufficient "need for 
relief."201 Justice Douglas based this analysis squarely on the absolute 
priority rule. Only mildly restated, his reasoning was that because the 
property was worth less than the senior debt, there would never, under 
the absolute priority rule, be anything left for juniors. The same result 
would obtain in state foreclosure anyway, so there was no reason for 
the reorganization court to take jurisdiction.202 Under this logic, the 
equity owners of the debtor can never keep anything in a reorganiza-
tion unless they pay the prior claims in full. For debtors, this consid-
erably reduces the attractiveness of a statute like Chapter X. And that 
would explain why Justice Douglas, going back to Case, was so insis-
tent on trying to make room for the new value rule. 
B. Articulating the New Value Rule - Kansas City Terminal 
This analysis provides a basis for understanding why Justice Doug-
las, in Case, embraced the new value principle so enthusiastically. Ad-
mittedly in Case, it was the old shareholders who raised the new value 
issue. Recall that the plan was to distribute shares to the old share-
holders even though senior claims remained unsatisfied. The old 
shareholders sought to justify their continued participation by offering 
" 'their familiarity with the operation' of the business and their 'finan-
cial standing and influence in the community,' " together with " 'con-
tinuity of management.' " 203 This contribution, they argued, justified 
their continued participation. 
Conceivably Justice Douglas, in rejecting this plea, might simply 
201. 317 U.S at 84. 
202. The case may sound perplexing to a modern reader since the property in question is a 
single office building, for which it would appear that the going concern value and the liquidation 
value are the same. That being the case, a composition would not pass a "liquidation" test either; 
cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(71) (1982) ("liquidation test" under Chapter 11). But Justice Douglas 
chose not to rest on that proposition. For the new value rule in Marine Harbor, see supra text 
accompanying note 61. 
203. 308 U.S. at 112-13. 
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have shown that there was no new value rule under the absolute prior-
ity standard of Chapter X. Or he might have left the issue open, argu-
ing that whether there was a new value rule or not, it didn't fit this 
case.204 But he did neither. Quite the contrary, he embraced the new 
value principle with seeming enthusiasm and undertook to spell it out 
in some detail. "It is, of course, clear," he stated, "that there are cir-
cumstances under which stockholders may participate in a plan of re-
organization of an insolvent debtor. "205 Where the necessity for new 
money exists, he continued, "and the old stockholders make a fresh 
contribution and receive in return a participation reasonably 
equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made."206 
Justice Douglas relied for this proposition on one previous case 
from which he quoted liberally, Kansas City Terminal Railway Co. v. 
Central Union Trust Co. of New York. 201 To understand fully what 
Justice Douglas was up to in Case, Kansas City Terminal deserves a 
careful reading, for, in fact, it stands for less than Justice Douglas 
made of it. 
Kansas City Terminal was a classic equity railroad reorganization, 
involving the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company (the 
"Katy"). 208 The property of the Katy was to be sold to a new corpo-
ration. The reorganizers offered compensation in new securities to all 
classes - secured creditors, unsecured creditors and stockholders. As 
to stockholders, the plan offered participation if they paid a cash as-
sessment. As to unsecured creditors, the plan offered a choice between 
two options: one required payment of an assessment, the other did 
not.209 
Central Union, an unsecured creditor,210 challenged the plan as 
unfair, insofar as it compensated stockholders without fully compen-
sating the unsecured creditors. The matter came before the Supreme 
Court in the form of three questions submitted by the court below -
as it were, a request for an advisory opinion. The questions, as Justice 
204. This latter approach is, of course, the approach of Justice White in Ahlers. See 108 S. 
Ct. at 968. 
205. 308 U.S. at 121. 
206. 308 U.S. at 121. 
207. 271 U.S. 445 (1926). 
208. With customary lack of imagination, the new company was to be called the Missouri-
Kansas-Texas Railroad Company. 
209. Requiring a new contribution from old equity as a condition of continued participation 
seems to have been a standard device in reorganization cases: one infers that it is the preferred 
method of raising new capital. Such an assessment was required in the plan in Northern Pac. 
Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
210. Central Union had sought to establish itself as a secured creditor, but without success. 
Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 294 F. 32 (8th Cir. 1923). 
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McReynolds stated in his opinion, "lack[ed] precision,"211 but it is 
possible to extract some core of meaning from them anyway. 
Question 1 asks whether the plan may be imposed on unsecured 
creditors if it "does not give precedence to the entire claim of the cred-
itor over any part or interest of a stockholder."212 In modern par-
lance, that is, the question asks whether the plan may be confirmed 
even though it violates the absolute priority rule. Justice McReynolds 
stated that this question "if interpreted strictly ... must be answered 
in the negative."213 In other words, he was reaffirming (or at least he 
thought he was reaffirming) the absolute priority rule. But his "expla-
nation" raises complications, to which we will return in a moment. 
Question 2 asks whether the plan may pay junior and senior classes 
with the same kind of security, given appropriate adjustments for 
value.214 The question may sound odd to the modern mind, accus-
tomed to treating the form of payment as irrelevant, so long as the 
payee gets adequate value. But it probably was an important question 
in Justice McReynolds' day, so this was probably important also. 
Nevertheless, it has no direct relevance to the new value problem, and 
we need concern ourselves no further with it here. 
Question 3 needs to be set forth in full. It provides: 
Is such offer as to such creditors fair and binding if it consists only of the 
same grade of securities as offered the stockholders, the difference being 
that the right of the stockholders to participate is conditioned upon the 
payment of an assessment or the payment of a relatively greater assess-
ment than that asked of such creditors, provided the court shall be of the 
opinion that the offer tenders to such creditor[s] all that could reason-
ably be expected under all of the existing circumstances?215 
Disentangled, this 85-word skein of rhetoric and argumentation prob-
ably contains at least five subquestions. Separately, they would go 
something like this: (a) Assuming a plan cannot be made binding by 
giving different classes the same securities, can it be made binding by 
making the junior class pay an assessment? (b) Assuming the same 
facts as in (a), can the plan be binding when both classes pay an assess-
ment, provided the junior class pays a larger assessment? ( c) If the 
proposals in (a) and (b) are not valid per se, can they be made valid by 
a court's finding that the offer is "all that could reasonably be 
expected"? 
Even as differentiated, there are a number of problems with this 
211. 271 U.S. at 453. 
212. 271 U.S. at 452. 
213. 271 U.S. at 455. 
214. 271 U.S. at 452-53. 
215. 271 U.S. at 453. 
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list. Subquestions (a) and (b) become moot when the court decides (as 
it did decide) that it is permissible to pay two classes with the same 
kind of security. The best one can do to salvage them is to construct a 
new subquestion ("subquestion (d)"), which assumes that it is permis-
sible to pay two classes with the same kind of security. It asks 
whether the plan is made any less permissible if one or more of the 
classes also, contributes cash. This question has the virtue of clarity, 
but at the price of bordering on the frivolous: the answer must be that 
there is no objection to paying with both securities and cash; clearly, 
Justice McReynolds would have agreed. Meanwhile, subquestion (c) 
("all that could reasonably be expected") hovers like a minatory cloud 
over the whole analysis. What, exactly, could the concept of "reason-
able expectations" add to, or subtract from, the formulations already 
set forth? The answer must be that it adds nothing - unless its pur-
pose is to permit variations from the absolute priority rule.21 6 
So far, none of this presents the new value issue with the precision 
of Justice Douglas in Case. In order to do that, it is necessary to for-
mulate a separate question ("subquestion (e)"): Is it permissible for a 
junior class to participate, even though senior classes are not paid in 
full, provided that the junior class makes a contribution of new value 
corresponding to the value it retains?217 If Justice McReynolds had 
asked it, the answer would, conceivably, have given authority to the 
new value issue. 
This exercise in question framing may seem tedious and arcane, 
but there is a point to it all. The point is to make clear why it is not 
surprising that Justice McReynolds gave a muddled answer to the new 
value issue. The point is that he started with a muddled question, or 
questions. Given this muddle, Justice McReynolds repeatedly contra-
dicted himself in his analysis. Like subquestion (c) above, he took 
away with one hand what he gave with the other. 
Thus, as part of his general discussion, Justice McReynolds offered 
language which seemed to acknowledge the absolute priority rule. He 
declared: "Unsecured creditors of insolvent corporations are entitled 
to the benefit of the values which remain after lienholders are satisfied, 
whether this is present or prospective, for dividends or only for pur-
poses of control."218 Note that, although a bit imprecise, this sounds 
like absolute priority. But Justice McReynolds didn't stop there. In-
stead, he asserted that reasonable adjustments should be encouraged: 
216. The same proviso, and the same problem, presents itself in Question 2. 
217. This is, of course, not the only possible way of stating the new value issue. 
218. Kansas City Terminal, 271 U.S. at 455. 
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"Practically, it is impossible to sell the property of a great railroad for 
cash; and, generally, the interests of all parties, including the public, 
are best served by cooperation between bondholders and 
stockholders."219 
But what was there to cooperate about or adjust? Either absolute 
priority is the rule, or it is not. In any event he continued: "If credi-
tors decline a fair offer based upon the principles above stated, they are 
left to protect themselves. After such refusal they cannot attack the 
reorganization in a court of equity."220 
That would make sense if we knew which of the "principles above 
stated" he was referring to. It could be he was referring to the abso-
lute priority principle. Or it could be that he was referring to the 
"principle of cooperation," which seems quite independent of it. 
Moreover, it is not clear what he could have meant when he said credi-
tors "are left to protect themselves." This is an equity receivership by 
compulsion of the court; the creditors have no other choice but to deal 
with the debtor in this proceeding. 
Specifically addressing the questions certified, Justice McReynolds 
first addressed Question 1 - whether a plan may be confirmed if it 
violates the absolute priority rule. As we have already seen, "inter-
preted strictly," Justice McReynolds answered this question nega-
tively.221 Using language that would be quoted by Justice Douglas in 
Case, he continued: "[T]o the extent of their debts creditors are enti-
tled to priority over stockholders against all the property of an insol-
vent corporation. "222 This sounds like pure absolute priority doctrine. 
In two succeeding sentences, he went on to say that creditors need not 
receive senior securities, and that it might be possible to compensate 
them in other ways - thus answering Question 2 which, strictly 
speaking, he hadn't even posed yet. In addressing Question 1, Justice 
McReynolds went on to state that "[g]enerally, additional funds will 
be essential to the success of the undertaking, and it may be impossible 
to obtain them unless stockholders are permitted to contribute and 
retain an interest sufficiently valuable to move them."223 
This statement about new value224 concerned neither absolute pri-
ority (Question 1) nor form of payment (Question 2). Instead, it seems 
to be preparing to respond to (hypothetical) subquestion ( e) of Ques-
219. 271 U.S. at 455. 
220. 271 U.S. at 455 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913)). 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13. 
222. 271 U.S. at 455 quoted in Case, 308 U.S. at 116. 
223. 271 U.S. at 455. 
224. Justice Douglas cited it in Case, 308 U.S. at 117. 
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tion 3 - also not yet formally posed. In any event, Justice McReyn-
olds, still answering Question 1, continued: "In such [!] or similar [?] 
cases the chancellor may exercise an informed discretion concerning 
the practical adjustment of the several rights."225 This can be read to 
stand for the proposition that in (a) cases where it is necessary to dis-
tribute the same securities to more than one class, or (b) cases where it 
is necessary to induce continued participation from the former share-
holders, or (c) "similar situations," then the chancellor is not bound 
by the absolute priority rule, which contradicts the first sentence of 
this same response. In the same vein, answering Question 3, Justice 
McReynolds stated: "Whenever assessments are demanded, they 
must be adjusted with the purpose of according to the creditor his full 
right of priority against the corporate assets, so far as possible in the 
existing circumstances."226 It is not clear which circumstances he was 
referring to, given the context of the opinion. In fairness to Justice 
McReynolds, I note that Justice Douglas quoted both of the two com-
peting sentences last quoted.227 But in the context of Case, it seems 
hardly to present the grounds for misunderstanding that are evident 
here. 
The gist of this analysis is that Justice McReynolds' opinion in 
Kansas City Terminal, while it does indeed contain intimations of an 
absolute priority rule and also of a new value exception, is equivocal at 
best, and can be read as supporting something quite different. All this 
is captious or fanciful in the absence of evidence that the opinion was 
actually (mis)read this way. Fortunately, evidence was already at 
hand in the interpretation by the lower court on remand, approving a 
revised reorganization plan. 228 The plan allocated value to all classes, 
including equity. Since neither absolute priority nor its recently-
hatched new value corollary guided the Court, the governing princi-
ples of the case are obscure. There was no pretense of a valuation, no 
pretense of an allocation of value in terms of claims, and no pretense 
that shareholders were being compensated according to their contribu-
tion. The plan was simply confirmed, and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. 229 
The point of all this is that neither of the cases taken as seminal for 
225. 271 U.S. at 455 (exclamation added). 
226. 271 U.S. at 456. 
227. Case, 308 U.S. at 117. 
228. Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 28 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1928). For 
a more detailed analysis of Kansas City Tennina/ on remand, see Billyou, supra note 51, at 553, 
559-60. 
229. 278 U.S. 655 (1929). 
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the new value doctrine can be read as an application of the new value 
doctrine. Kansas City Terminal "states" it, but in a self-contradictqry 
manner, and accepts the ruling of the lower court when that court 
chose not to apply it. Case "states" it well enough (indeed, one is 
tempted to say that Justice Douglas understood Justice McReynolds' 
opinion far better than Justice McReynolds understood it himself) but 
then refuses to apply it on the particular facts. One gets the distinct 
impression that the real purpose of "restating" Kansas City Terminal 
with such force in Case was to take the sting out of what was other-
wise a fairly radical interpretation. Only Justice White's opinion in 
Ahlers subsequently recognized the new value rule. But to assert that 
Justice White recognized the rule stretches a point, because he specifi-
cally refused to commit himself on whether any new value rule re-
mains in the Code. On the other hand, Case and Kansas City 
Terminal, which Justice White recognized as the fountainheads of new 
value doctrine, didn't apply it either. We examine Justice White's 
nonapplication of the rule more exhaustively in the next section. 
C. Ahlers on New Value 
Ahlers poses a two-fold issue: (1) whether there is a new value 
exception and, if the answer is "yes," then (2) whether the ~erses' 
farming efforts constitute sufficient new value to protect them from the 
absolute priority rule. For the moment, it is useful to restrict our-
selves to the first of these questions - whether there is a new value 
rule. 
1. New Value After the 1978 Bankruptcy Code 
The court of appeals in Ahlers had no trouble finding that there 
was a new value rule, relying chiefly on Kansas City Terminal. 230 The 
Solicitor General's appellate brief231 granted that Case established a 
new value exception232 but questioned whether it survived the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code. 233 In a note, the brief stated that the lower courts 
seemed "to be divided on this question."234 To support the existence 
of the rule, the brief cited five cases - two from circuit courts (the 
230. 794 F.2d at 401. 
231. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 17-23, Norwest 
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (No. 86-958). 
232. He recognized this exception as dictum. Id. at 23. 
233. Id. He also stated that "the Code has changed prior law and that, under Chapter 11 of 
the Code, equity owners can never participate in a reorganized enterprise over the dissent of a 
class of creditors whose claims are impaired and who do not receive or retain property of a value 
equal to the allowed amount of their claims." Id. 
234. Id. at n.15. 
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Sixth and the Seventh Circuits) and three from bankruptcy courts,235 
noting that "[s]ome bankruptcy courts have implied, if not held, that it 
is no longer possible for equity holders to retain ownership over the 
objection of a class of creditors whose claims are not fully 
honored."236 This somewhat clumsy choice of language was appar-
ently intentional.237 The brief based this concession on Justice Doug-
las' acceptance, in Case, of Kansas City Terminal 238 Arguing that the 
new value doctrine did not survive the 1978 Code, the Solicitor Gen-
eral made what amounted to two separate arguments - one of which 
I shall call the "statutory construction" argument and the other of 
which I shall call the "plausibility" argument. 239 As to statutory con-
struction, he indicated that the 1978 Code, unlike its predecessors, 
clearly defined "fair and equitable,"240 arguing that the comprehensive 
definition left no room for a new value principle. Second, the Solicitor 
General argued that "nothing in the legislative history suggests a con-
gressional intention to maintain" the new value rule.241 
Moving onto a somewhat more spacious plane, the Solicitor Gen-
eral argued that it was "not surprising" that the Code dropped the 
new value rule242 in light of two conditions that do not exist at this 
time. One is the state of the law itself: under the present Code, unlike 
old Chapter X, the creditors may waive the absolute priority rule by 
an appropriate vote, meaning that the Congress opted to let creditors 
decide whether continued debtor participation is desirable. The sec-
ond argument asserted that today's capital markets differ from those 
of 1939, where the old shareholders might be the only source of new 
capital; today, this is "a much less realistic concem."243 
235. In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Potter Material Serv., Inc., 781 
F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Sawmill Hydraulics, Inc., 72 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987); In 
re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); In re Marston Enterprises, 13 
Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
236. Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 18 n.15, Norwest 
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (No. 86-958). He cited In re Pine Lake 
Village Apartments Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), and In re Pecht, 57 Bankr. 137 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986). 
237. See infra text accompanying notes 244-45. 
238. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 19, Norwest 
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (No. 86-958). 
239. The Solicitor General did not structure the argument precisely this way; I am restating 
it for convenience in understanding. 
240. Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 20 n.17, Norwest 
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (No. 86-958). 
241. Id. at 21. 
242. Id. at22. 
243. Id. The Solicitor General is tantalizingly noncommittal. The Court was right in its 
former perception of capital markets, and contrastingly affirmative that capital markets are fluid 
today. 
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The Supreme Court refused to find that the new value rule has 
been abolished, ruling instead that Ahlers' efforts would not in any 
event constitute sufficient new value under the rule. Justice White 
wrote that "our decision ... should not be taken as any comment on 
the continuing vitality of the [new value rule]."244 The Court dis-
missed the Solicitor General's argument on the rule in one moderately 
detailed footnote. In it, Justice White states that the issue "has di-
vided the lower courts since passage of the Code in 1978."245 Support-
ing this proposition, he curiously offered a "compare, e.g., " citation, 
citing two cases that do not deliver what the citation seems to promise. 
2. New Value Case Law in the Lower Courts 
Justice White cited In re Sawmill Hydraulics, Inc. 246 to support the 
new value rule when, in fact, Sawmill Hydraulics cites the rule, but 
then refuses to apply it.247 Sawmill Hydraulics does cite some (but not 
all) of the relevant case law in its footnote 1,248 to which Justice White 
adverts, but that is another story. 
The second case cited, In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 249 
lacks an identifiable holding. In Pine Lake Village,_ the shareholders of 
the debtor proposed to. make a new value contribution to retain their 
interest, 250 and the judge refused confirmation. But it is altogether 
unclear what relation, if any, the judge saw between :pew value and 
confirmation. He seems to have relied simply on the basis that the 
creditor was not being fully compensated, without seeming to grasp 
that the debtor was trying to take himself outside the rule. Pine Lake 
Village seems to have worked its way into Justice White's thinking via 
the brief of the Solicitor General; but, in fact, the Solicitor General 
was unwilling to assert that Pine Lake Village flatly rejected the rule. 
The most the Solicitor General was willing to do was argue that Pine 
Lake Village "implied, if not held" that new value was no longer 
viable.251 
244. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 967 n.3. 
245. 108 S. Ct. at 967 n.3. 
246. 72 Banlcr. 454 (Banlcr. C.D. Ill. 1987). 
247. The Sawmill Hydraulics court held, first, that labor and services will not constitute new 
value - i.e., essentially the same result Justice White would reach in Ahlers. 72 Banlcr. at 457. 
The court went on to hold that a shareholder guaranty of debt not previously guaranteed might 
constitute new value, but that the debtor had failed to establish that his contribution equaled or 
exceeded the value of the retained interest. 72 Banlcr. at 458. 
248. 72 Banlcr. at 456 n.1. 
249. 19 Banlcr. 819 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
250. 19 Banlcr. at 823. 
251. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 18, Norwest 
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (No. 86-958). 
1010 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:963 
Justice White could have taken the alternative approach that there 
are at least four courts (two circuits and two bankruptcy courts) that 
have ordered confirmation of plans where the creditors were not fully 
compensated, on the strength of contributing new value.252 Moreover, 
there is no contrary authority, although Pine Lake, on its facts, may be 
teased into that result. That ended Justice White's direct encounter 
with the new value problem. 
3. New Value and the Going Concern 
Later in the opinion, Justice White addressed another argument 
which he treated as separate from the new value analysis, but which, 
as we shall see, may be closely related to it. The debtors argued that 
"the property which the [debtors] wish to retain has no value to the 
senior unsecured creditors."253 The debtors further asserted that "be-
cause the farm has no 'going concern' value (apart from their own 
labor on it), any equity interest they retain in a reorganization of the 
farm is worthless, and therefore is not 'property' under [the cram-
down rule]."254 According to this view, the debtors' retained equity 
interest in the farm would have value only in their hands, and thus 
their interest could never detract from the value properly accorded to 
senior claims. 
Justice White rejected the argument, stating that 
Even where debts far exceed the current value of assets, a debtor who 
retains his equity interest in the enterprise retains 'property.' ... Indeed, 
even in a sole proprietorship, where 'going concern' value may be mini-
mal, there may still be some value in the control of the enterprise; obvi-
ously also at issue is the interest in potential future profits of a now-
insolvent business. 255 
Justice White joined "with the overwhelming consensus of authority" 
in rejecting the "no value" argument.256 For the moment, it is proba-
bly useful to note that the "no-value" argument seems to involve two 
separate issues: one is the question of who may enjoy the "going con-
252. Teamsters Natl. Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck 
Co.), 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986); Official Creditors' Comm. v. Potter Material Serv. (In re 
Potter Material Serv., Inc.), 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Brown's Indus. Uniforms, 
Inc. (In re Brown's Indus. Uniforms), 58 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Landau Boat 
Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). A fifth case, Buffalo Savings Bank v. Marston 
Enters. (In re Marston Enters.), 13 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), is often cited as the 
"first" new value case under the 1978 Code. But in fact, the court in Marston Enterprises refused 
confirmation for lack of a consenting class. See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
253. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 969. 
254. 108 S. Ct. at 969. See infra text accompanying notes 262-69 for an explanation of the 
cramdown rule. 
255. 108 S. Ct. at 969. 
256. 108 S. Ct. at 969. 
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cern premium" in a Chapter 11 case; the other is whether one can ever 
impute different "values" to the property in the hands of different par-
ties. Just about everyone talked about the new value issue as if it in-
volved the going concern premium. It is better understood as 
involving the second, more abstract, question. Thus, the cou'rt of ap-
peals explicitly treated the matter as a controversy over "going con-
cern" and "liquidation" values: 
[T]he reorganization value of the [Ahlerses'] farm exceeds its liquidation 
value - if the plan is rejected, the unsecured creditors will get nothing, 
whereas they will receive annual payments if the plan is approved and is 
successful. The [Ahlerses'] farm operation and management skills are 
something of a value which would disappear if their farm was liquidated. 
Because that value cannot be captured for creditors in the event of liqui-
dation, fairness is not violated if their Chapter 11 plan leaves that value 
in their hands. 257 
This may be attractive a8 a pragmatic matter, but the court of appeals 
was simply wrong. In fact, this issue was vigorously debated in the 
development of the current Bankruptcy Code. Under the original pro-
posed draft, a court might have been permitted to do just exactly what 
the Eighth Circuit proposed to do here - i.e., allow the former equity 
holder to participate on the strength of future contribution alone. 258 
The matter was vigorously debated in the law reviews,259 and the act 
adopted contains no such provision. 260 
The difficulty with this "going concern premium" approach is that 
it is, as a matter of history at least, conceptually irrelevant to the new 
value argument. Justice Douglas, who insisted that there was indeed a 
new value exception to the absolute priority rule, also formulated the 
principle that the creditor in an old Chapter X case had the right to 
the entire going concern premium.261 
D. Can There Be a New Value Rule? 
Recall that in Ahlers, the Solicitor General argued that the new 
value rule had been "repealed" by the adoption of the new Chapter 11, 
but the Court refused to rule on the issue. But close scrutiny of the 
opinion yields two surprising inferences. First, Justice White may in-
deed have "overruled" the new value exception, whether he intended 
257. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402. 
258. CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 277. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
259. See generally Blum & Kaplan, supra note 83, at 651; BrudneY, supra note 79, at 306; 
Trost, supra note 72, at 542. 
260. On the going concern premium, see particularly Pachulski, supra note 64, at 939. 
261. The convergence is most obvious in a case like Marine Harbor Properties, where it 
would seem the going concern value and the liquidation value are very likely the same. Justice 
Douglas insisted nonetheless that the absolute priority applies. 
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to or not. And second, new value may have been an illusion all along 
- or less dramatically, there may never have been an adequate doctri-
nal basis for the new value rule, as articulated by Justice Douglas. Of 
course, there were later lower court cases that purported to "apply" 
the rule.262 But a careful reading of Ahlers, together with Case and its 
kin, suggests that they may never have been well founded. 
Consider the following example. John Debtor is president and ma-
jority shareholder of Debtorco, a closely-held corporation. Debtorco 
sedulously observes corporate formalities, and there is no doubt that 
Debtor and the corporation are separate entities. Debtorco owes $100 
to Loanco, a creditor that holds a security interest in all Debtorco 
assets. Debtorco also owes a total of $50 to a total of five unsecured 
creditors. The court "finds" the value of Debtorco's assets to be $85. 




$100 (Loanco secured debt) 
$ 50 (trade creditors) 
Shareholders' Equity 
(-$ 65) 
In behalf of Debtorco, John Debtor proposes the following plan: 
Debtorco will give Loanco a note with a present value of $85 secured 
by all the assets of Debtorco, satisfying Loanco's secured claim.263 
The $15 deficiency on Loanco's secured claim will be grouped with the 
$50 worth of trade debt into a single class of unsecured claims. 
Debtorco proposes to satisfy the claim of this class by a single cash 
payment of $10. The $10 payment for unsecured creditors will come 
from John Debtor, who will make the payment in exchange for new 
shares. All old Debtorco shares will be cancelled, and all creditors 
holding unsecured claims vote on the plan. All except Loanco vote in 
favor; Loanco votes against. May the plan be confirmed? 
On the information given, the answer would appear to be clearly 
"yes," except for a question over the $10 payment, which I shall 
address below.264 Debtorco has divided the obligation of Loanco into 
secured and unsecured claims. 265 On the secured claim, it seems clear 
that Loanco is "impaired."266 Since Loanco is impaired and does not 
accept, the treatment of the secured claim makes the plan 
262. See infra notes 284-300. 
263. That is, a note conforming to the standards of 11 U.S.C. § l 129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1982). 
264. Loanco may be able to defeat the plan by making the election under 11 U.S.C. § 111 l(b) 
(1982), but, practically speaking, it isn't likely and, in any event, it is irrelevant to the analysis set 
forth here. See generally Klee, All You Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New 
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 152-56 (1979). 
265. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). 
266. 11 u.s.c. § 1124 (1982). 
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nonconfirmable, unless Debtorco can effect a cram-down.267 In fact, 
Debtorco seems to have brought itself within the cram-down 
"exception" of section 1129(b ), which permits confirmation over the 
dissent of an impaired class. That is, Loanco keeps its lien268 and 
appears to receive the "value" for its secured claim provided under tpe 
cram-down rule.269 Thus, Loanco may be bound even without its 
consent, and the unsecured claims are treated together as a class. The 
class is clearly "impaired,"270 but as to a particular class, a plan may 
be binding if it receives the consent of that class.271 Acceptance 
requires the consent of a majority in number and two thirds of those 
voting. 272 All creditors except Loanco vote in favor; thus, since the 
plan has won the requisite acceptances from this class, the dissent of a 
minority of that class is irrelevant.273 
There is one further relevant confirmation standard, of course. 
That is, the plan may be confirmed over the dissent of an individual 
creditor (as distinct from a class of creditors) if that individual creditor 
will not receive less than he would receive in liquidation.274 But no 
individual creditor in the foregoing example will receive less than he 
would in liquidation because the $10 payment to fund the payment to 
the unsecured class will come not from corporate funds, but from 
personal funds of the shareholder. These funds will be available only 
in Chapter 11, and would not be available in liquidation. 
Thus, on all points discussed here, the plan would appear to be 
confirmable. And so we turn to the presence of new value - the 
contribution from the shareholder. But here is the problem: What is 
it that the shareholder purports to be "buying" with his $10? The 
obvious answer has to be the residual equity in the company. But the 
balance sheet after confirmation, and before the $10 contribution, 





267. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1982). 
268. 11 U.S.C. § 1129{b)(2)(A)(i)(l) (1982). 
Shareholders' Equity 
$-0-
269. 11 U.S.C. § 1129{b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1982) ("deferred cash payments totaling at least the 
allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value 
of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property"). This problem of "value" is a 
critical consideration; it is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 278-282. 
270. 11 u.s.c. § 1124 (1982). 
271. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1982). 
272. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982) (the class of unsecured claims). 
273. If all creditors vote, it will be impossible for Loanco to defeat the "class" confirmation 
under§ 1129(a)(8). There are five other creditors; thus Loanco is outvoted, 5-1. Two thirds of 
the $65 worth of claims would be $43.33. The ~ve other creditors hold claims totalling $50. 
274. 11 U.S.C. § 1129{a)(7)(A)(ii) (1982). 
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Given that no one would pay $10 for a company with a net worth of 
zero, then the offer of a $10 payment has to be taken as an 
"admission" that the company is worth more than $85. But if it is 
worth more than $85, then Loanco's secured claim is undervalued, 
and Loanco is not being fully compensated on that secured claim. 
That being the case, cram-down is not available, and the plan may not 
be confirmed. 
The same logic forbids confirmation at any valuation until Loanco 
either (a) consents or (b) receives full value for its claim. The plan as 
sketched is one possible Chapter 11 new value plan. It is modeled 
roughly on cases like Radford and Wright Ill where the issue was one 
of compensation to a secured class. 
Other variations are possible. For example, it is possible to design 
a plan similar to the one in Ahlers, where confirmation may turn on 
compensation for the unsecured class. Thus, in the above example, 
suppose Loanco were the only creditor. Suppose the court "finds" 
that the value of Debtorco is $85. Suppose the shareholders propose 
to give Loanco a secured note with a present value of $85, to pay 
nothing to the unsecured, to cancel the old shares, and to issue new 
ones in consideration of a new value payment of $10. Debtorco will 
argue that Loanco has been fully compensated on its secured claim as 
required by section l 129(b ). Debtorco will concede that the unsecured 
class (i.e., Loanco as the holder of a $20 claim) is deemed not to have 
accepted275 but will argue that the plan may be imposed on this 
dissenting unsecured class because no junior class will "retain" 
anything under the plan.276 True, the ''junior" shareholder class will 
wind up with the reorganized company but will achieve it not by 
"retention," but by its $10 new value contribution. Once again, the 
rejoinder will be that if the old shareholders are willing to pay $10 for 
the reorganized company, then they are conceding that it is worth 
something more than $85. If it is worth something more than $85, 
then Loanco as the sole creditor is being undercompensated. 277 
In another hypothetical, suppose that Loanco is a sole creditor, has 
a claim of $100, and that the claim is entirely unsecured. Suppose the 
court "finds" that the value of Debtorco is $85, and that it undertakes 
to give a note for that amount to Loanco in full satisfaction of its 
275. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1982). For whatever it is worth, Debtorco will make the snme 
concession to "old" equity. But since "old" equity is receiving 100% of the residual interest in 
the reorganized company, old equity will not complain. 
276. 11 u.s.c. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982). 
277. This is the case either in its role as secured claimant or in its role as unsecured claimant; 
from the point of view of Loanco, it comes down to the same thing. 
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claim, retaining the residual equity interest in exchange for a $10 
payment. The same reasoning seerris to follow: Debtorco argues that 
cram-down is possible because it is not "retaining" any interest, per 
section l 129(b )(2)(B)(ii), while Loanco will argue that its desire to pay 
for the asset amounts to a concession that it is worth something more 
than $10. 
In the abstract, it might be possible to argue that there is more 
than one "value" that may be relevant to a bankruptcy case, and that a 
court might, without inconsistency, impute one "value" to the 
creditor's interest and another to the debtor's interest in the same 
property.278 From the standpoint of doctrine, however, there is a 
difficulty in that this is precisely the argument that Justice White 
seems to have rejected in Ahlers - specifically, when he rejected the 
so-called "no value" argument, summarized above.279 To recall, the 
Ahlerses had argued that they should be permitted to retain their farm 
because the creditor had been deprived of nothing of value. Justice 
White roundly rejected this argument, stating that he was joining "the 
overwhelming consensus of authority" on this issue:280 "Indeed, even 
in a sole proprietorship, where 'going concern' value may be minimal, 
there may still be some value in the control of the enterprise; 
obviously, also at issue is the interest in potential future profits of a 
now-insolvent business."281 Restated, this seems to mean that 
anything retained by the debtor must be "value" for purposes of 
Section 1129(b ). If that is the case, then there is no basis for letting 
the shareholder participate on the basis of new value. If this is true, 
then at least it is the case that the new value strategy is impermissible 
under the new Code. But it seems that under the same theory, new 
value was impermissible under Chapter X as well. The difficulty is 
that in applying the absolute priority rule under Chapter X, it is clear 
that creditors had the right to the entire "going concern value" of the 
business. We have this on the authority of no less an arbiter than 
Justice Douglas himself.282 This has always been accepted as the 
unvarying Chapter X rule.283 But if the going concern value belongs 
to the creditor and not to the equity owners, then it is impossible to 
imagine what there can be for the equity owners to "buy." And if 
there is nothing for the equity owners to buy, then the new value rule, 
278. The case for multiple values is set forth at length in Pachulski, supra note 64, at 951-64. 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 255-57. 
280. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 969; see also supra text accompanying notes 256-57. 
281. 108 S. Ct. at 969. 
282. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). 
283. See Pachulski, supra note 64, at 938-39. 
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just as it does not exist under Chapter 11, did not exist under Chapter 
X. At first blush, the point may seem frivolous: after all, Justice 
Douglas, who insisted that the creditors owned the going concern 
value, also insisted on the new value rule. But recall: Justice Douglas 
in Case did not implement the rule, nor did he in Marine Harbor 
Properties, nor did he ever implement the new value rule, at least not 
under Chapter X. What he did in Case was to take an older, well-nigh 
unintelligible decision, handed down before the absolute priority rule 
had truly crystallized, and dress it up in respectable garments, where it 
served to dignify the absolute priority pronouncement. In order to 
understand this, it is desirable to take one more look at the cases, and 
to identify those instances where the new value principle has in fact 
been applied. 
E. Applying the Rule 
1. Pre-1978, Under Chapter X 
The courts apparently applied the new value rule under old Chap-
ter X. There appears to be no reported case in the entire period in 
which the court expressly permitted the "debtor," or former equity 
owners, to retain assets on the strength of a new value contribution 
and for no other reason. But the fact is that Justice Douglas' supposed 
"exception," born of the confusion of the Kansas City Terminal opin-
ion and matured in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, is nowhere present as 
a rule of decision in Chapter X cases. New value under Chapter X, 
then, is an illusion. 
2. Post-1978, Under Chapter 11 
Under Chapter 11, unlike Chapter X, a handful of cases purports 
to apply the new value principle, but they are instructive in their own 
way. In particular, the genesis of new value doctrine under the 1978 
Code represents a remarkable instance of doctrinal circularity, where 
law was created out of nearly nothing. 
The sequence begins with In re Landau Boat Co., 284 a Chapter 11 
case heard in the winter of 1981. The debtor first proposed a plan 
whereby shareholders would retain an interest although creditors were 
not paid in full. The court rejected that first offering as a violation of 
the absolute priority rule (Landau I). The scene then shifts to New 
York and the case of In re Marston Enterprises, 285 where the debtor 
sought to fend off foreclosure on an apartment building. In Marston, 
284. 8 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). 
285. 13 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
April 1989] Rethinking Absolute Priority 1017 
the equity owners proposed to fund the plan through pro rata contri-
butions of new value. The plan proposed to cancel all the old shares, 
but to issue all new stock to the old owners in proportion to their 
contributions. The court discussed the proposal with citations to 
Case, Louisville Trust, and Landau Boat: 286 
There is no statutory prohibition against original shareholders making a 
substantial necessary capital contribution in consideration for which 
they received shares of stock in the reorganized corporation. There is 
also nothing in the Code which precludes the case law which developed 
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, relating to corporate reorgani-
zation, from application of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 287 
Then the court makes a startling assertion: "The case of In re Landau 
Boat Co . ... adapts these principles to the Code."288 Concededly, 
Landau I talked about the new value problem. But in fact, of course, 
the only way in which Landau I "adapted" the principles to the Code 
was by refusing to apply them. Nevertheless, the court in Marston 
used Landau I as authority for validating the new value principle in 
Marston. 
Having done as much, however, the court in Marston refused con-
firmation on other grounds.289 Thus, while Marston does purport to 
rule on the new value issue, it ultimately provides no more support for 
the principle than Landau L The privilege of actually implementing 
the new value principle was left, rather, to a new round of litigation in 
the Landau case, where the court at last approved a debtor's plan 
(Landau II). 290 In this plan, the owners proposed to cancel all old 
stock and issue new stock to purchasers who would give cash and loan 
commitments. The owners offered to take up all of the new issue, but, 
in a novel departure, they also expressed their willingness to share pro 
rata with creditors if the court saw fit. The court approved the plan, 
relying on Marston! The court cited the language that the Marston 
court had drawn from its analysis of Landau L 291 
Since then, at least three other courts - two circuits and a district 
court - have approved new value plans. The most recent - and the 
most intriguing - is In re U.S. Truck Co., 292 a panel opinion from the 
Sixth Circuit. The proponent, an investor who had taken control of 
286. 13 Bankr. at 517-18. 
287. 13 Bankr. at 518. 
288. 13 Bankr. at 518. 
289. The issue was whether there was a "consenting class" within the statutory definition. 
The court held that there was not. 13 Bankr. at 520-21. 
290. In re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). 
291. 13 Bankr. at 792. 
292. 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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the company after the Chapter 11 filing, proposed to cancel the old 
equity and buy up the new shares for $100,000. The panel affirmed a 
district court confirmation order in a brief and somewhat elliptical 
opinion, treating the district court findings as not clearly erroneous. 
The court treated the law on new value as settled, citing Case and 
Kansas City Terminal 293 ·A fuller exposition is available in the opin-
ion of the district court, where the plan is set forth in full.294 What is 
evident in the district court opinion is the very unusual nature of the 
underlying dispute. The objecting creditor was the Teamsters Na-
tional Freight Industry Committee, purportedly speaking in the inter-
est of union truck drivers. From a reading of the opinion, two 
novelties appear: First, the union was not as concerned with money as 
with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement that the court had 
earlier authorized the debtor to reject. The National Committee took 
the position that it would object to any plan until the earlier collective 
bargaining agreement was accepted in full.295 Second, the labor appa-
ratus did not speak with one voice on the plan. Thus, while the Na-
tional Committee persisted in its objections throughout the case, the 
local union and the debtor at several points reached agreement on how 
the case was to be conducted. It seems clear that the district court, at 
least, was treating the National Committee's objection as a complaint 
about the integrity of the collective bargaining process, and irrelevant 
to the issue of confirmation. 
Just a few months earlier, the Seventh Circuit had reached the 
same conclusion in Official Creditors' Commn. v. Potter Material Ser-
vice, Inc. 296 The debtor proposed a plan whereby unsecured creditors 
stood to receive three percent of their claims. The sole shareholder 
proposed to pay $14,800 of his own funds toward the three percent. 
He also undertook to pay the debtor's attorney's fees and to renew a 
personal guarantee on some pre-Chapter 11 debt.297 Once again the 
circuit said the trial court finding was not clearly erroneous. As in 
293. 800 F.2d at 588. 
294. In re U.S. Truck Co., 47 Ban1cr. 932 (Ban1cr. E.D. Mich. 1985). The plan is in an 
appendix. 47 Bankr. at 944-52. 
295. See 47 Ban1cr. at 935-41. The National Committee's strategy seems clear from its ap-
proach to the plan. By the terms of the plan, the employee-claimants would have the right either 
to 70% on the effective date of the plan or to 100% over three-and-a-half years. But, at least as 
represented in the opinion, the objector directed all its attention to the collective bargaining 
agreement and none to the size of the payment. 
296. In re Potter Material Serv. Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986). 
297. Not the least puzzling point of the opinion was the court's conclusion that he "re-
newed" the guarantee. 781 F.2d at 102. On the facts presented, it seems he had no choice; 
otherwise, the guaranteed creditor probably would have been impaired and could have rejected 
the plan. 
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U.S. Truck, the court treated the principle of new value as settled -law, 
relying on Case, Marston, and Landau IL One district court reached a 
similar result, concluding with similarly minimal discussion that the 
bankruptcy court's decision was not clearly erroneous.298 One bank-
ruptcy court has also applied "new value" as settled law.299 
Thus, two circuits and one district court now accept the new value 
principle, relying on what Marston drew from Landau L and what 
Landau II drew from Marston, together with citations to Case or Kan-
sas City Terminal as needed. What is striking about all these cases is 
that almost no one challenged the existence of the new value principle 
per se. The courts discuss related issues like the question whether the 
value offered is sufficient to the case, or whether the contribution of 
the old equity is "essential," but the principle is taken as a matter of 
authority. The only clear exception is Marston, where the court at-
tempts to justify the new value principle this way: 
If $300,000 to $400,000 of new money were needed to fund the plan, and 
the consideration came from new investors who were not shareholders, it 
would not violate the fair and equitable rule to permit them to contribute 
capital and receive shares of stock in the reorganized corporation. There 
is no reason why investors of new capital who happen to be shareholders, 
whose equity interest as old shareholders is extinguished, should be dis-
qualified from investing in the reorganized corporation, where their con-
tribution is substantial, as is the case herein. It would not violate the fair 
and equitable standard. Joo 
With all due respect to the court, this completely misses the point. 
Of course it is true that an outsider might pay $300,000 to $400,000 
for the equity in a particular case. But under ordinary circumstances, 
that money would go straight through to creditors, with the old equity 
getting none of it - a sale, as it were, by the creditors, of their stake. 
Undoubtedly, the outsider's willingness to pay $300,000 or $400,000 
signals the outsider's belief that the asset is worth at least as much as 
the sum paid. But in the case of the outsider, the price is arrived at by 
competitive bargaining. It is one thing to let the outsider buy the asset 
in such a market transaction, quite another to let the old equity ac-
. quire it by a sort of "eminent domain." 
3. Some Comparisons 
Lest the point be forgotten, it is important to emphasize again that 
Justice White in Ahlers treated the issue as statutory only, rejecting 
298. Brown v. Brown's Indus. Uniforms, Inc. (In re Brown's Indus. Uniforms), 58 Bankr. 
139 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985). 
299. In re Jartran, 44 Bankr. 336 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984). 
300. 13 Bankr. at 518. 
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any suggestion of a constitutional taint. This point comes into focus 
when one examines the various approaches undertaken by Congress in 
various chapters of the Bankruptcy Act and Code. 
Thus, while there may be no clear support for the new value prin-
ciple in old Chapter X, it seems clear that it was available under Fra-
zier-Lemke, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Wright IIL 301 As 
was set forth above, in Wright III the Court held that the debtor might 
retain his farm property, as long as the creditor got the "value" of his 
collateral. 302 The debtor, of course, will not want to retain the prop-
erty unless it is worth his while to compensate the creditor in this way. 
That is, he will not want to retain the property unless he believes he 
can make something more out of it than what he will have to pay the 
creditor. In the typical case, it is hard to see how he will do this unless 
he contributes new value - e.g., his labor or experience at farming. 
Of course, Justice Douglas authored Wright IIL 303 
The same can be said about both Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 of the 
present Bankruptcy Code. In each case, the Code permits the debtor 
to retain property that might otherwise go to creditors, even where 
creditors are not paid in full.304 This is the process that Justice White 
seems to have been approving, at least in dicta, in Ahlers. 305 In Chap-
ter 12 and Chapter 13 (as, indeed, in Frazier-Lemke before them), one 
principle is particularly noteworthy. Under both chapters, the success 
of the plan normally turns on a contribution of the debtor's "earn-
ings." Post-bankruptcy earnings are not, typically, property of the 
bankruptcy estate. 306 This principle is anomalous to the extent that it 
treats earnings from human capital (i.e., wages) as different from earn-
ings of other kinds of capital (which do become property of the estate). 
At the very least, it provides inescapable evidence that Congress re-
gards itself as empowered to determine what is, and what is not, prop-
erty in a particular case, within some limits. 
301. 311 U.S. 273 (1940). 
302. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
303. The Court decided Case on November 6, 1939, and Wright Ill a bit over a year later, on 
December 9, 1940. No matter what anyone might say about Justice Douglas - and many have 
said a great deal - no one ever doubted his analytical ability. Although there is no cross-
reference, it is inconceivable that he did not see the relationship between the two cases. 
304. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1325 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
305. See 108 S. Ct. at 970. 
306. No one doubts this principle, but as a statutory matter, it must be derived indirectly. It 
can be gleaned from the fact that post-petition earnings will be included in the estate under 
Chapters 12 and 13, while there is no comparable provision in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1207, 
1306 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For an effort to cope with the distinction under Chapter 11, see In 
re Fitzsimmons, 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. In re Lynn, 18 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1982). ' 
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The situation under Chapter 7 is more complicated, in some inter-
esting ways. Suppose the debtor owns an auto that he uses for plea-
sure only, subject to a security interest. Suppose that the debtor owes 
$15,000 to the secured party; that the car is worth $9000, and that 
there is no relevant right of exemption. How, if at all, may the debtor 
keep the car in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy? 
The first point to notice is that this question concerns only the ~ 
debtor and the secured party. That is, because the collateral is worth 
less than the claim of the secured party, the trustee will typically aban-
don the estate's interest. 307 As against the secured party, the debtor 
may be able to· keep the car. Section 722 of the Code gives him a 
limited right to redeem, upon certain conditions apparently met here. 
In order to redeem, he must pay the creditor "the amount of the se-
cured claim" - by hypothesis in this example, $9000. 308 The provi-
sion is limited, of course, to the kinds of property specified in section 
722 and to requiring the debtor to pay cash - he cannot employ a 
time-payment schedule. 309 As with the other provisions sketched 
here, in orqer to make the provision intelligible, it is necessary to ma-
nipulate the concept of "value": thus, it must be the case that the 
debtor regards the car as worth more to him than the $9000 value 
"found" by the court. The statute is thus theoretically limited; prac-
tice, of course, is another story. An individual creditor may choose to 
let the debtor retain other collateral on payment of something less 
than the outstanding debt, or even on time payments, and experience 
suggests that he often will. But aside from the statute, he does so only 
because he decides that it is in his interest - i.e., he decides that the 
debtor, even with a scaled-down liability, is a better deal than any 
alternative. 
F. What Is New Value? 
There remains one issue central to Ahlers not directly addressed in 
this article so far. In a way, it is the most visible issue of all: Should 
the Ahlerses' "contribution" of their efforts constitute new value? 
Discussion of the issue in the context of this article is somewhat un-
real, of course, because if there is no new value rule at all, it makes no 
sense to ask whether a thing does, or does not, constitute new value. 
Nevertheless, a discussion of the Court's approach to the new value 
problem may help to explain just why the concept is so elusive. 
307. The trustee may do so under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). 
308. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). 
309. In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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The court of appeals enthusiastically embraced the idea that the 
Ahlerses' work constituted new value sufficient to let them keep the 
land. "Certainly," the court said, "a farmer's efforts in operating and 
managing his farm is [sic] essential to any successful farm reorganiza-
tion, and this yearly contribution is measurable in money or money's 
worth."310 The court defined this contribution as "the farmer's labor, 
including the value of his experience and expertise in farming the 
land."311 As to value, the court of appeals distinguished between the 
value of the farmer's contribution and the value of the retained inter-
est. The court stated that the value of his contribution "should not be 
overly difficult to determine."312 The court conceded that "[v]aluing 
the retained equitable ownership interest ... is a more difficult prob-
lem" but was confident that it could be done.313 
Justice White, refusing to recognize the contribution as value, put 
the case within the ambit of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products. 314 
Justice White didn't try to treat Ahlers as identical with Case on the 
issue; he called it "analogous."315 Obviously, no two cases are identi-
cal, and in any instance. where the court asserts a principle of "like-
ness," it must necessarily also recognize a principle of "difference." 
But the "differences" between Case and Ahlers are more than trivial. 
Case involved a corporate reorganization and Ahlers a farm. As ar-
gued above, Ahlers factually resembles Radford far more than it does 
Case. The shareholders in Case, hoping to retain an interest, offered 
their "continuity of management" and "financial standing and influ-
ence in the community."316 Although Justice Douglas did not articu-
late it, the tenor of his opinion indicates that he did not believe that 
this constituted any "contribution" at all, either of new value or other-
wise. Recall that the central problem in the old equity receivership 
cases was the problem of insider collusion. Justice Douglas, of all peo-
ple, suspected a situation in which insider bondholders might conspire 
with insider shareholders to the expense of outsiders of whatever class. 
Insiders in this situation could hardly be expected to give reliable testi-
mony as to what was "value" or not. That, after all, was implicit in 
the proposition that the absolute priority rule could not be waived by 
any majority, no matter how large. Certainly no one could argue that 
310. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402. 
311. 794 F.2d at 402. 
312. 794 F.2d at 402. 
313. 794 F.2d at 402-03. 
314. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 967. 
315. 108 S. Ct. at 967. 
316. 308 U.S. at 122. 
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there was any risk of collusion between the debtor in Ahlers and any of 
his creditors. 
By rejecting the "labor" argument, Justice White thought he was 
bringing himself within an unbroken tradition. He observed that 
" '[P]revious attempts to qualify non-capital equity in the absolute pri-
ority context have been 'unanimously rejected.' "317 
He was following the lead of counsel here, but, strictly speaking, 
he was wrong. In fact, there is one case, Horowitz v. Kaplan, 318 where 
a court of appeals authorized participation for a contribution of man-
agement skills, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 319 The court 
in Horowitz distinguished Case in three ways: First, the debtor in Case 
did not show any important contribution by management; second, 
there were some nonmanagement stockholders in Case who appeared 
to be making no contribution at all; and third, there was no binding 
commitment on management in Case to stay with the reorganized 
company. Horowitz thus can be read as a recognition that Case is not 
so much about an improper kind of value, but about something closer 
to the absence of value altogether. 
Justice White made one other argument in rejecting the labor con-
tribution that, while not wrong, is highly misleading and could be 
damaging if misunderstood. It is an argument from legislative history. 
Specifically, he argued that the Bankruptcy Commission, in its initial 
proposal, offered a provision which would have allowed continued 
participation on the basis of a nonmonetary contribution, but that the 
provision was stricken. 320 Justice White is right on this point, but he 
did not specify that the proposed provision would have allowed the 
court to order continued participation, whether the creditors agreed to 
it or not. The provision was supplanted by one that permits creditors 
as a class to accept less than full payment by an appropriate vote. 321 
Justice White's statement could leave the incorrect impression that a 
dissenting creditor might block a plan, even if approved by a majority, 
if the shareholder's continued participation was based on management 
skills. 
However, saying that Ahlers is different from Case is not the same 
as saying that Ahlers was wrongly decided. In saying the "value" in 
317. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 967 n.4 (quoting Koger & Acconcia, In re Ahlers: Capitalizing on 
Sweat, 42 J. Mo. BAR 455, 458 (1986)). 
318. 193 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1951), affg. In re Waltham Watch Co., 97 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass. 
1951). 
319. 342 U.S. 946 (1952). 
320. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 968. 
321. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1982). 
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Ahlers was not sufficient, there were at least two approaches available 
to the Court. One, reflected in Horowitz, is to question whether the 
Ahlerses were bound to anything or whether, by contrast, they were 
undertaking to buy an option. To understand this point, consider 
what would have happened if the plan had been confirmed and the 
Ahlerses had decided not to follow through. What sort of remedy 
would the creditors have had against them? It is hard to identify a 
situation where any meaningful remedy would have been available. 
Presumably a plan, if confirmed, would have imposed personal liabil-
ity on them for the unsecured debt, but they were for all practical 
purposes judgment-proof. This fact obviously impressed Justice White 
when he spoke of the contribution of future services as "intangible, 
inalienable, and, in all likelihood, unenforceable."322 
The second approach is to try to identify just what the Ahlerses' 
"contribution" might be, apart from the "capital" of the bank. Both 
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court seem to have assumed 
that there was some sort of "going concern" value that would not be 
realized in "liquidation." But it is not clear that this is so. Quite the 
contrary, it would seem that there is every reason to assume that an-
other farmer could operate the farm as well as Ahlers. 323 If that is the 
case, then whatever "value" a farmer's efforts might have is already 
reflected in the value of the farm. 324 If this is true, then what is the 
point of discussing new value at all? An answer could be that the 
"value" in Ahlers, is the product of human capital, exempt from bank-
ruptcy administration, except when explicitly included. The validity 
of this distinction depends, of course, on the validity of the distinction 
between the products of human capital and the products of other 
kinds of capital - a distinction noted, although not defended, above. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE MEANING OF Ahlers 
In this article I have tried to put Ahlers in the context of history 
and doctrine, showing that the new value doctrine, tested in Ahlers' is, 
at best, highly evanescent. I have also shown how the Court, while 
322. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 967. 
323. I forebear to say "perhaps better." One might make the argument that if the Ahlerses 
are in bankruptcy, it must be because they were, relatively speaking, bad managers, but it is not 
clear that this is so. It is perfectly possible to assume that they were doing as well as anyone else 
might have done. 
324. The court of appeals talked about the Ahlerses' contribution as if that contribution was 
necessary to protect the "unsecured" claimants (presumably excepting the deficiency claims of 
the mortgagees). It is true that they are "like" Ahlers in their rights to payment once the land is 
sold on foreclosure. But if the land has truly been undervalued, and if the sale price is high 
enough to pay all secured creditors' claims, then the unsecured creditors have the right to any 
surplus. 
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skirting constitutional doctrine, has characteristically avoided putting 
the problem in any such framework, and Congress seems to have felt 
comfortable imposing results that are at least superficially inconsis-
tent. Thus I have suggested a lack of controlling "theory" in this 
realm. On the other hand, I have not tried to supply any such theory, 
nor do I lament the possible absence of one. The effort to articulate 
"theory" for bankruptcy and kindred subjects is certainly alive and 
well, 325 but theorizing requires theoretical justification. 326 And at 
least in this realm, Congress and the courts fo1.ve proven uniquely re-
sistant to pressures to organize their work under any grand design. 
Their reasons for resistance may be better than our instincts might 
first suggest: once burnt, twice shy, might do for starters. Or more 
generously, the work product of both the courts and Congress may 
bespeak a conviction that bankruptcy law is too complex for, facile 
categorization. Taken in context, the teaching of Ahlers may be: Con-
gress can give the debtor leeway, but not too much. Properly ~der­
stood, that may be a good enough rule until a better one comes along. 
325. The most obvious theoretical work is surely T. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986); cf. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986). Other attempts at theorization, while few, are not entirely lacking. 
Among earlier items, see particularly Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1 
(1940); CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at ch. 3, 75-96. The same instinct may be seen even 
more dramatically at work in the law of secured transactions where, as Professor Buckley has 
recently remarked, the traditional view "might have persisted, had not recent commentators 
sought to defend it." Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1393-94 
(1986). Major recent theoretical work in the field is listed in Professor Buckley's article. See id 
at 1394 nn.3-4. 
326. A strong case for theory in commercial law studies may be derived from Clark, The 
Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238 (1981). 
